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Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.1
Political campaigns, and the advertisements that accompany
them, often resemble children in an argument on the playground.
One can imagine a politician responding to an attack advertisement
with the popular playground retort "sticks and stones may break my
bones but words will never hurt me." While on the playground
words may be harmless, in politics, it is words, not sticks, that do
the most harm. Political advertisements, "issue advertising," and
"party building" activities have all been used to attack opponents,
shade the truth, and influence the outcome of elections. It is
because of this power-the power of words and the political
advantage to those who have the financial ability to deliver
them-that spending on political advertisements has skyrocketed.2
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LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat'l
Home Library Found. ed. 1933), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
2 Ruth Marcus, Costliest Race Nears End; Bush, Gore Running Close; U.S. Campaigns
Fuel $3Billion in Spending, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2000, at Al; Michael Trister, The Rise and
Reform of Stealth PACS, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24-Oct. 2, 2000, at 32. According to the
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, independent expenditures
on "issue advertising" have risen from $135-150 million in the 1995-1996 election cycle to
$509 million in the 1999-2000 cycle. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING
DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (1997), available at http://www.appcpenn.org/issueads (last
visited June 17, 2002) (stating 1995-1996 figures); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON ET AL., ISSUE
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The integrity of the political process depends on voters being able
to judge the merit and accuracy of campaign related speech.' This
is possible when candidates engage in campaign speech, and the
voters know its source.4 Candidates, however, are not the only ones
with an interest in the campaign. Third-party actors-groups or
individuals not associated with a specific political candidate or
party-have become more active in the political debate. These
groups have specific agendas and are often engaged in activities
designed to promote candidates that support their agendas. Unlike
candidates and political parties, however, these third parties often
escape the reach of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)5 and
therefore are not subject to provisions requiring disclosure of
campaign contributions or expenditures.6  Absent disclosure
provisions, third parties can hide their involvement in a campaign
and engage in secret campaign speech.7
ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE 4 (2001), available at http://www.appcpenn.
org/issueads (last visited June 17, 2002) (estimating 2000 cycle spending).
3 See 146 CONG. REC. H5286 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Kasich) ('Give
the ordinary citizen the right and the power to know who is behind all of these political
organizations, all of them, and they will make the smart decision and they will use the real
power in America, which is the power of the ballot box."); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT
KEETER, WHATAMERICANS KNOwABOuTPOLITIcSAND WHYITMATTERS 22-50 (1996) (arguing
that democracy functions best when electorate is properly informed).
' See Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts
and in Congress, 27 OLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 681 (2002) ("Voting cues must provide
accurate information to voters in order to empower them.").
' Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431.456 (2000).
6 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-702, at 13 (2000) (citing unreported contributions of
National Education Association as example of lack of disclosure of information by § 527
organizations). House Report 106-702 is the report of a previous attempt to amend § 527
through legislation called the Full and Fair Political Activity Disclosure Act of 2000, H.R.
4717, 106th Cong. (2000). H.R. 4717 did not become law. The provisions at issue here were
also included in H.R. 4717, and the report references are to sections that appear in both bills.
Under FECA, individuals or groups that engage in express advocacy must disclose
contributions in excess of $200. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1), (c)(2)(C) (2000). For a discussion of the
growth of independent expenditure funding of political campaigns, see HERBERT E.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 64 (4th ed.
1992); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1751, 1760 (1999).
But see generally Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Bootie" Mandating Donor
Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998) (arguing
that mandatory anonymity should replace mandatory disclosure to prevent corruption in
campaign contributions). Although mandatory anonymity is theoretically possible, it is
practically impossible to ensure. Moreover, anonymity raises further concerns about the
electorate's ability to weigh the credibility of the information provided.
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In the last twenty years, independent anonymous campaign
speech, often referred to as "stealth advertising,"8 has become a
dominant force in political campaigns in the United States.9 This
stealth advertising threatens one of the foundations of our demo-
cratic system-that election decisions are made by an informed
electorate-for it is difficult for voters to fully judge the merit and
accuracy of third-party advocacy if they do not know its source.1"
Third-party advocacy groups often avoid campaign finance
restrictions because they use "independent expenditures" to engage
in only "issue advertising."" Third-party advocates argue that since
they only engage in issue discussion, they are not subject to
campaign finance regulations. 2 These organizations, however, often
" See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, "Stealth" Ads Revive Efforts to Change Election-
Finance Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 12, 2000, at 2; Jonah Goldberg, Campaign
Reform Threatens Free Speech, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 5, 2002, at All; see also 144 CONG.
REC. S10145, S10149 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement by Sen. Snowe).
" See generally France R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New
Campaign Vehicle, 86 TAX NOTES 387 (2000); JAMIESON, supra note 2.
10 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't, 528 U.S. 377, 414-15 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that states are free to require disclosure of large contributions); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 223 (1999) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
that disclosure helps voters make intelligent choices in election process); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (observing that disclosure of source of advertising may
be required "so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
subjected"); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
favorably House and Senate language that "[the statute rests on] the fundamental
constitutional principle that our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish
between the true and the false"). For an excellent discussion of voter competence and the
need for campaign disclosure, see generally Garrett, supra note 4.
" Independent expenditures are amounts spent on political advertising that are not
directed by or associated with a candidate or political party. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 47-
48 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that express advocacy, speech that expressly advocates
the election or defeat of a candidate, can be regulated. Id. at 44. Some Courts have defined
that speech, which is not express advocacy, to be issue advocacy. Under this definition, issue
advertising has been defined as advertising that does not expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm.
v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000). More recently, at least one court has
recognized that issue advocacy is not defined as the absence of express advocacy, see Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. U.S., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1324-25 (S.D. Al. 2002) ("It is
at best imprecise to employ the term, 'issue advocacy,' to denote all political speech other than
express electoral advocacy. Use of the term in this manner incorrectly suggests that all
political speech falling short of express electoral advocacy is essentially issue discussion
(thereby skewing the constitutional analysis), regardless how plain the communication's
electoral purpose. Buckley employed no such term, and the Supreme Court later used it to
describe a much more limited range of political speech.").
"I See Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 (putting forth
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engage in advertising designed to influence an election and promote
a specific candidate, and do so without identifying their real identity
or the identity of their contributors."1
For example, during the 2000 presidential primaries, "Republi-
cans for Clean Air" ran the following advertisement:
ON THE SCREEN: Mr. McCain's face is superimposed
against a backdrop of smokestacks belching dark clouds.
SCRIPT: "Last year, John McCain voted against solar
and renewable energy. That means more use of coal-
burning plants that pollute our air. New York Republi-
cans care about clean air. So does Governor Bush ....
Governor Bush: Leading so each day dawns brighter." 4
Republicans for Clean Air was an unknown organization and it
did not disclose its sponsors.15 The advertisement was alleged to be
highly inaccurate. 6 The Bush campaign denied any knowledge of
the advertisement, and the person who purchased the time from the
argument of plaintiffs that they are not subject to campaign finance regulation because they
are engaged in issue advocacy).
"3 A clear example of just such a case is the advertisement by Republicans for Clean Air
that follows this note in the text. For other examples, see Edward B. Foley, "Smith for
Congress" and Its Equivalents: The Importants of Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 2
ELECTION L.J. 3, 4-7, 22 (2003).
" Richard Perez.Pena, Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000,
at A15. Similar political advertisements ran in New York, California, and Ohio. Adam
Nagourney & Richard Perez-Pena, Bush and McCain Trade Bitter Criticism As Campaigns
in New York Gather Steam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at A15.
's See Perez-Pena, supra note 14.
16 Press Release, Sierra Club, Sierra Club Demands Withdrawal of False Bush Ad (Mar.
3, 2000), available at http://lists.sierraclub.org/Archives/ce-scnews-releases.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2003); Environmental Front Group Smokescreens Bush Pollution Record, Press
Release, Sierra Club, Environmental Front Group Smoke Screens Bush Pollution Record
(Mar. 1, 2000), available at http://lists.sierraclub.org/Archives/ce-scnews-releases.html (last
visited Jan. 14,2003); see also Ad Praising Bush's Record on Air Quality is Called Dirty, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 2000 (discussing press release of League of Conservation Voters claiming
that then-Governor George W. Bush "has the weakest environmental record of any major
presidential contender"). In fact, the environmental groups determined that Senator John
McCain's record was slightly better than Bush's on the environment. Perez-Pena, supra note
14, at A15.
614
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television networks refused to disclose who paid for the advertise-
ment. 7
After some pressure, Sam and Charles Wyly disclosed that they
were the sponsors of the advertisements." The Wyly brothers were
Texas billionaires and major contributors to the Bush campaign."9
However, the Wylys claimed their political advertisements were
independent of the Bush campaign, did not advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate for public office, and therefore were not subject
to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).0 Because they were
allegedly exempt from FECA, Republicans for Clean Air claimed it
was not required to disclose its contributors or its expenditures in
any manner.2'
17 Perez-Pena, supra note 14. Governor Bush's advisors denied any connection between
their candidate and Republicans for Clean Air. Id. The media company that placed the
advertisement had a long history of working for Governor George Pataki of New York, a
strong Bush supporter, and the address used when placing the advertisements was a post
office box that was also used by a Political Action Committee (PAC) led by Congressman
Henry Bonilla of Texas, another Bush supporter. Id. The executive director of Bonilla's PAC
acknowledged that she was a consultant to Republicans for Clean Air. Nagourney & Perez-
Pena, supra note 14, at A15. For an interesting discussion of the connection between
candidates and so-called "independent" organizations, see Andrew P. Buchsbaum, Campaign
Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation ofIndependent Political Committees, 71 CAL. L. REV. 673,
675 n.15 (1983).
"s Clay Robinson, Campaign 2000; McCain Stays on Offensive; Bush Wins Backingof N.J.
Governor, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 5, 2000, at A21 (indicating that on March 3, 2000, Wylys
disclosed that they were sponsors of advertisement).
The Wyly brothers spent $2.5 million on the advertisements praising then-Governor
Bush and attacking Senator McCain. Id. Charles Wyly's wife, Caroline Wyly, was appointed
by President Bush to serve on the John F. Kennedy Center Advisory Committee on the Arts.
Digest of Other White House Announcements, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 615 (Apr. 15,
2002). Charles Wyly was also one of President Bush's "pioneer" fund-raisers and raised at
least $100,000 for the President's campaign. Michael Petrocelli, Bush Names Wife of
Campaign Supporter to Kennedy Center, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 11, 2002, at A5. He and his
brother also each contributed $100,000 to the Bush-Cheney Inaugural Committee. Id.
20 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000). At least one
scholar believes that Republicans for Clean Air was required to report under FECA. Glenn
Moramarco argues that section 527 political organizations are political committees under
FECA and thus are subject to disclosure. Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt
Organizations: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 106th Cong. 60 (2000) (statement of Glenn J. Moramarco, Senior Attorney, Brennan
Center for Justice). Maramarco argues that the fact that the Federal Election Commission
does not have the votes to enforce the provision does not mean that political organizations are
not in fact subject to it. Id. at 62. The FEC voted by a vote of three to three not to investigate
whether Republicans for Clean Air violated election law. Fed. Election Comm'n, Executive
Session, MUR 4982 (2002).
21 Professor Edward Foley has recently suggested that an advertisement that compares
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I The Republicans for Clean Air advertisement highlights the
problem of third-party independent expenditures. The advertise-
ment by Republicans for Clean Air was an obvious attempt to
engage in negative advertising designed to influence the election
against Senator McCain and to promote then-Governor Bush.
Republicans for Clean Air nevertheless was able to avoid federal
election campaign disclosure provisions by claiming that the
advertisement in question did not expressly advocate the election of
Governor Bush.
The proliferation of independent expenditures during political
campaigns and the difficulty in identifying the source of those
expenditures increased the pressure for the reform of campaign
regulations that apply to third-party advocacy.2 After the primary
campaign, Senator McCain joined with Senators Joseph Lieberman
(then a Vice-Presidential candidate) and Russell Feingold to craft
legislation to require the disclosure of the names of contributors to,
and the expenditures of, what they termed "stealth PACs."23
Because the Supreme Court had previously struck down campaign
disclosure provisions in FECA associated with issue advocacy, 4
Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Feingold took another approach.25
Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Feingold sought to use the tax
code as a mechanism for requiring independent third-party
organizations to make campaign disclosures similar to those
contained in FECA. The senators accomplished this by amending
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), which deals with
the tax status of political organizations.26 The reformers amended
section 527 and created campaign finance disclosure provisions in
two political candidates should be considered an election advertisement for FECA purposes.
See Foley, supra note 13, at 3, 4-7, 22. Under this theory, the Wyly advertisement clearly
would be an election advertisement subject to FECA.
2 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-702, at 12-13 (2000); BECK, supra note 2, at 3-6; JAMIESON,
supra note 2, at 1-2.
2 146 CONG. REC. 55995 (daily ed. June 28,2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman); see also
S. 2582, 106th Cong. (2000) (amending § 527 of Internal Revenue Code to better define term
"political organization"); S. 2583, 106th Cong. (2000) (amending Internal Revenue Code to
increase disclosure for political organizations exempt under § 527).
24 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
' For a discussion of issue advocacy, see generally Briffault, supra note 6.
I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
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the tax code by conditioning tax benefits on compliance with the
disclosure provisions."
Soon after the enactment of section 527, reformers enacted a far
more sweeping reform of federal election law. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002,28 commonly referred to as "McCain-
Feingold," took a different and complimentary approach to that
taken in section 527.29 Instead of taking the entity based approach
and requiring disclosure based on an entity's status under the
Internal Revenue Code, McCain-Feingold takes a "categorical
approach." McCain-Feingold requires the disclosure of all "election-
eering communication," which is defined as broadcast communica-
tion that takes place within sixty days of a general election and
refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office."0 McCain-
Feingold has a more limited definition of what communication is
covered, but covers all organizations engaged in such communica-
27 I.R.C. § 5270). The IRS also was required to make the disclosure forms available on
the Internet. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(3); see also Internal Revenue Service, Forms and Electronic
Filing for Political Organizations, at http://eforms.irs.gov (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (listing
disclosure reports for political organizations). This provision also applies to Form 990, which
is filed by 501(c)(3) organizations. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1). As a result of this provision, names
and addresses of students receiving financial aid from private schools that are 501(c)(3)
organizations were disclosed on the Internet. Valerie Strauss, Students' Financial Aid
Revealed on the Internet, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001, at B1. The names of donors to section
501(c)(3) organizations may have to be disclosed to the IRS on Form 990, but donors' names
are not disclosed to the public. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3)(A).
" Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456).
' Although outside the scope of this paper, McCain-Feingold does far more than just
regulate campaign disclosure. Among other things, it sets expenditure limitations for
noncandidates, raises contribution limits to candidates, and clarifies standards for
identification of sponsors of radio and television communication. Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act § 201, 116 Stat. at 88.91.
ao Electioneering communication is defined as:
any broadcast; cable, or satellite communication which-
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within-
aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office
sought by the candidate; or
bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or
caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate,
for the office sought by the candidate; and
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an
office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 434(O(3)(A)(i), 116 Stat. at 89.
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tion.3 ' Section 527 covers fewer actors engaged in political speech,
but requires disclosure of all campaign-related communication by
those actors.3
2
The amendments to section 527 and the McCain-Feingold
disclosure provisions have the same goal, requiring the disclosure
of third-party independent communication. There is a serious
question, however, whether the definition of electioneering commu-
nication in McCain-Feingold can withstand constitutional
challenge.3" The disclosure provisions enacted within the tax code
will likely survive such challenge and may, in fact, provide support
for upholding the disclosure provisions in McCain-Feingold. If
disclosure provisions are constitutional within the tax code, the
Court may view similar provisions outside the code more favorably. 
34
The recent campaign finance reform amendments to the tax code
raise serious questions involving tax law, election law, and constitu-
tional law. The disclosure provisions contained in section 527 are
a first step in limiting anonymous campaign communication by
political organizations and providing voters with the information
they need to make informed decisions.
The constitutionality of using the tax code as a mechanism for
campaign finance reform disclosure provisions has significant
ramifications for whether or not Congress will have the ability to
limit the proliferation of third-party anonymous campaign commu-
nication. Moreover, as third-party tax-exempt organizations
proliferate, the constitutionality of using the tax code as a means of
regulating those organizations will be of great importance. Increas-
ingly, tax provisions and campaign finance provisions will need to
3' I.R.C. § 527(a). (e), (j) (2000).
2 Id.
' See Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm'n, No. 02-CV-582 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.law.
stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
" Moreover, McCain-Feingold contains limits on contributions to political parties. In
order to avoid the contribution limits, political parties have created separate tax-exempt
organizations to raise unlimited campaign funds. See Thomas B. Edsall, New Ways to
Harness Soft Money in Works, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al (discussing new tax-exempt
organizations created by political parties and stating that supporters of McCain-Feingold
contend that these activities are purposeful evasions oflaw). Many of these organizations will
be subject to disclosure requirements of section 527.
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compliment one another in an attempt to achieve coherent campaign
finance reform.35
Part I of this Article examines the history and operation of
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code.3" Part II argues that
Congress has the authority to condition a political organization's
tax-exempt status on the organization's willingness to comply with
the disclosure provisions contained in section 527."7 Moreover, it
proposes that Congress create a separate entity, a political corpora-
tion, for campaign entities wishing to engage in anonymous political
advocacy.38 These organizations would not be subject to the
disclosure requirements of section 527, but would be subject to tax.
Part III discusses the traditional analysis that generally governs
campaign finance regulation and argues that the traditional
analysis provides an alternative basis for upholding the disclosure
requirements of section 527.9 Part III also suggests an alternative
approach for mandating campaign finance disclosure, which
combines the section 527 model and the traditional model. 40
The tax code may not be the best mechanism for achieving non-tax objectives. While
a thorough discussion of this is outside the scope of this Article, the tax code is obviously not
the ideal platform for regulating a tax-exempt entity's campaign activities. It appears,
however, that placing these provisions within the tax code may be the best way to ensure the
constitutionality of the disclosure provisions. The merits of using the tax code as a means of
influencing policy has been widely discussed. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.
McDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES 99-117 (1985); David A. Brennen, Charities and the
Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of
Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX. REV. 779 (2002) (analyzing use
of public policy exception to limit activities of tax-exempt charities); Edward A. Zelinsky,
James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulck A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures
and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165-84 (1993); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of
Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 440-41 (1986) (arguing that it is
questionable whether Government can use religious institution's exempt status as means of
regulating institution); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious
Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 329-31 (1986) (same).
Moreover, there are also serious concerns that involving the IRS in campaign finance
regulation will politicize the IRS and decrease our nation's confidence in tax administration.
For an interesting account of presidential attempts to use the IRS as a political tool, see
DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 226-54 (1989).
6 See infra notes 42-117 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 118-345 and accompanying text.
m See infra notes 346-53 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 354-413 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF SECTION 527
A. HISTORY OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Prior to the 1960s, the Internal Revenue Service generally took
the position that political organizations4' did not need to file tax
returns.42 The IRS apparently did so based on its view that political
organizations had no income and that payments to the organization
were gifts.43 In the late 1960s, however, it became clear that at least
" Prior to 1974 there was no specific definition of a political organization. Section 527
of the Code defines a political organization as an organization operated for the purpose of
directly or indirectly influencing the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1), (2).
4 S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25 (1974), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7501-02
(indicating payments were excluded as gifts); see also Tax Treatment of Contributions of
Appreciated Property to Committees of Political Parties, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,427 (Oct. 19,
1972) (indicating that it is a matter of history that the IRS has never required political
committees to file income tax returns because it believed that virtually all of the receipts were
from gifts). In at least one instance, however, the IRS claimed that a "membership fee" to a
political party was taxable, and asserted that all political parties are taxable associations
under the Code. Communist Party v. Comm'r, 373 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"' See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25; Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated Property
to Committees of Political Parties, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,427 (Oct. 19, 1972). Whether
something of value is determined to be a gift is treated differently for gift tax and income tax
purposes. In the estate and gift tax context, a gift tax is imposed on the donor if the donor
is not receiving compensation or adequate consideration in money or money's worth. I.R.C.
§ 2512(b) (2000). The.IRS treats payments to section 501(c)(4) organizations as gifts for gift
tax purposes, finding that the payments have not been made for money or money's worth.
Presumably the logic behind this treatment would also apply to political organizations, except
that section 527 organizations are exempt from paying gift tax under section 250 1(a)(5) of the
Code. The standard for determining whether a payment is a gift for income tax purposes is
whether the payment is made with "detached and disinterested generosity." Comm'r v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278,285 (1960). Although the standard for gift classification is different
for gift tax purposes and income tax purposes, it appears that the IRS treats contributions to
exempt organizations as gifts for both income and gift tax purposes. See Jeffrey Schoenblum,
The Changing Meaning of "Gift" An Analysis of the Tax Court's Decision in Carson v.
Commissioner, 32 VAND. L. REV. 641,647-67 (1979) (discussing how Carson eroded commonly-
accepted meaning of"gift"). Compare I.R.C. § 2512(b) (setting forth standard for gift tax) with
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285. But see Carson v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 864, 864 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding that campaign contributions are not "gifts" within meaning of gift tax law); Stern v.
United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding payment to political organization
not gift since payor received something in exchange for payment). Interestingly, in later
memoranda, the IRS indicated that the gift theory was never the basis for allowing the
exclusion of campaign contributions. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 n.32 (Mar. 19, 1990)
(claiming conduit or quasi-trust rationale was reason for exclusion); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,499
(Feb. 8, 1974) (claiming precise justification for excluding political campaign contributions
from gross income has never been clearly articulated, but that it is clear that justification is
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some political organizations were generating taxable investment
income. The IRS concluded that if a political organization had
income, it was required to file a return and that investment income
of a political organization should be reported on a fiduciary tax
return."' The tax situation of campaign organizations became even
more complicated as organizations started to receive appreciated
property in lieu of cash. The sale of appreciable property by a
political campaign would normally produce a taxable gain if it were
a for-profit corporation, but political campaigns had not been taxed
on such gain.4" In 1973, the IRS conducted public hearings to
determine how political organizations and donations of appreciable
property to political organizations should be treated for tax pur-
poses.4
6
In 1974, the IRS issued a revenue ruling designed to explain the
tax treatment of political organizations. 47 Revenue Ruling 74-21
involved an organization formed to engage in activities to influence
the nomination and election of individuals to public office.48 The
organization sought advice from the IRS regarding its tax status,
and the IRS determined that the organization "more nearly
resemble[d] a corporation than a trust or partnership, and that the
tax rules for corporations appl[ied]. ' The IRS then set out the
relevant tax principles that would apply to the organization.50 It
required the organization to submit a corporate tax return and pay
tax at the corporate tax rate.5" The IRS concluded, however, that
campaign contributions were not includible in gross income and that
not that contributions are gifts).
" S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25; Rev. Rul. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810,811 (indicating investment
income should be reported on fiduciary return); I.R.S. Announcement 73.84,1973.2 C.B. 461,
461 (indicating that political parties will now be required to file appropriate tax returns).
" S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25-27; see also Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated
Property to Committees of Political Parties, 37 Fed. Reg. at 22,427 (indicating that IRS has
never required political committees to file income tax returns); I.R.S. Announcement 73-84,
1973-2 C.B. 461, 461-62 (reversing previous position and finding that gains on sale of
appreciated property should be included in income, but applying ruling prospectively).
0 See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25-26 (referencing hearings); I.R.S. Announcement 73-84,
1973.2 C.B. 461, 461 (indicating hearings were held March 1, 1972).
'7 Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
s Id.
' Id. at 15.
50 Id. at 16.
a' Id.
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campaign expenditures were not deductible.52 The revenue ruling
indicated that the IRS would decide the tax status of a political
organization on a case by case basis.5"
In 1975, Congress absolved the IRS from having to determine the
tax status of every political organization and enacted section 527 of
the Code. 4 As enacted in 1975, section 527 provided for a new type
of exempt organization, a political organization, and clarified that
contributions to a political organization were not subject to tax and
that its expenditures were not deductible from income.55 The
provision defined a political organization as "a party, committee,
association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorpo-
rated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly
or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or
both, for an exempt function." ' Exempt function was defined as
"the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
Federal, State, or local public office."5" If an entity was considered
a "political organization," then its exempt function income-defined
as contributions, membership dues, and proceeds from political
fundraisers-was exempt from tax.58
82 Id.
" Id. Political organizations rarely had taxable income because of the IRS's conclusion
that contributions to political organizations were not includible in income. See Rev. Rul. 74-
21,1974-1 C.B. 14 (indicating that political organization most resembles corporation, and that
tax rules for corporations apply; finding that contributions to political organization did not
represent income to corporation). Moreover, a determination by the IRS regarding the tax
status of an organization only controls its tax status. Whether an organization is a
partnership or corporation outside the tax context is determined by state law.
" Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108, 2116-19.
5 I.R.C. § 527(a), (c) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 4, 25-37 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7481, 7501-13 (discussing modified tax treatment of political
organizations).
6 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
"7 I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (1976) (amended 1988).
s I.R.C. § 527(c)(3) (1976) (amended 1978); I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000). Political
organizations were still required to pay tax on their investment income. S. REP. NO. 93-1357,
at 26, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7502. Although section 527 applies to state and
local political organizations, it does not apply to state and local organizations that already
comply with state finance disclosure laws that are similar to those required by FECA. I.R.C.
§ 527(j)(5)(C). Under previous versions of section 527, state and local political organizations
were required to comply with the disclosure provision even if they made disclosures under
state campaign finance regulations. See I.R.C. § 527 (prior to November 2, 2002). The
amendments to § 527 ensure that state and local political organizations are not subject to
622
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Entities received a significant benefit by organizing as political
organizations, and therefore organized themselves as such under
section 527 of the Code.59 If an organization did not meet the
requirements of section 527, it was not entitled to exempt status
and its exempt function income would not be exempt from tax.60
In enacting the original provisions of section 527, Congress
clearly indicated that political organizations should not be taxed on
contributions they receive. In the legislative history surrounding
the original enactment of section 527, Congress determined that
encouraging political activities was an important policy goal, that
such organizations were "the heart of the democratic process," and
that such organizations should be encouraged by granting a
preferred tax status to qualifying political organizations.6 Congress
thus provided a tax benefit to organizations it believed contributed
to the democratic process.6 2
But when it passed section 527, Congress likely did not imagine
the type of political organizations that we now see involved in
influencing elections. Within section 527, Congress described
organizations whose primary purpose was to influence the election
of a candidate for public office.6" At the time this language was
included in section 527, such organizations were subject to campaign
disclosure requirements in the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, as amended in 1974." FECA was designed to regulate
duplicative reporting requirements. See generally Gregory L. Colvin & David A. Levitt,
Political Organization Reporting Requirements Continue to Evolve: Recent Amendments to
Internal Revenue Code Section 527, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 19-67 (2003).
59 See H.R. REP. No. 106-702, at 12 (2000) (stating that there is clear trend toward
increased use of section 527 organizations); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29,
1999) (addressing whether organization's diverse activities constitute exempt functions under
section 527(e)(2)); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997) (addressing social welfare
organization's maintenance of segregated funds under section 527(f)(3)).
6 S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 26.27. This implies that Congress intended that organizations
that did not meet the definition of a political organization would not be exempt from tax on
the contributions or payments they received.
61 Id.
If Congress provided a tax benefit to political organizations because it believed those
organizations were central to the democratic process, Congress surely has the power to
eliminate the preference if the organizations no longer serve designated purposes, or if, as
alleged, the organizations actually degrade the democratic process.
6 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
" Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat. 3 (as amended in
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)).
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campaign contributions and expenditures, and imposed contribution
limits and disclosure requirements on entities that attempted to
influence elections.6 5 Since section 527 organizations were orga-
nized to influence elections, they were by definition subject to
FECA's disclosure requirements. Section 527, as enacted, can be
seen as standing for the proposition that those entities properly
regulated under FECA are a beneficial part of the campaign process
and should be exempt from tax. 6
The congressional assumption that section 527 organizations
would be subject to FECA proved to be erroneous when in Buckley
v. Valeos7 the Supreme Court struck down and limited parts of
FECA.65 Specifically, in Buckley the Court interpreted language
almost identical to that contained in section 527 to apply only to
contributions and expenditures that expressly advocate the election
or defeat of a candidate for public office.6 9 Political organizations
argued that as long as they did not expressly advocate on behalf of
a candidate they were not subject to the reporting requirements in
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93.443,88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000)). FECA originally limited
contributions to a candidate for federal office to $1,000 with respect to any election, with the
primary and general election each constituting a separate election. FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)
(2000) (amended 2002). The McCain-Feingold campaign reform bill recently increased this
amount to $2,000. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 307(a), 116
Stat. 81, 102 (2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)). Entities are also required to disclose
contributions over $200 that were for the purpose of influencing elections. 2 U.S.C. §
434(c)(1), (c)(2)(C) (2000). Some scholars argue that these limits are unrealistically low and
that increasing them might increase compliance. See Joel Fleishman & Pope McCorkle,
Level- Up Rather Than Level-Down: Toward a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1
J.L. & POL. 211, 215 (1984) (stating that current theory of campaign finance reform is
impractical and dangerously wrong); Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First
Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1348,1365 (1994)
(stating that there is danger of making money supply too small for candidate demand).
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 434, 437a (2000) (providing
reporting requirements); Hill, supra note 9, at 390 (discussing assumption implicit in FECA
that section 527 organizations would be subject to FECA).
67 424U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 43-44. Section 431(8)(AXi) of FECA defines contribution as "any gift, subscription,
loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose
of influencing any election for Federal office," and section 431(9)(A)(i) defines expenditure as
"any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of
value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2
U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i) (2000).
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FECA.7" Political organizations therefore received the benefit of tax-
exempt status even though they were not subject to FECA. There
is no indication, however, that Congress intended this result.
In 2000, Congress expressed its displeasure with the fact that
many tax-exempt organizations were avoiding the disclosure
requirements in FECA by amending section 527 of the Code and
providing that political organizations must disclose the names of
contributors who donate $200 or more and disclose expenditures of
$500 or more.71
70 It is still an open question whether specific or so-called magic words of expression like
"vote for" or "vote against" are needed in order for an advertisement to constitute express
advocacy. See Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 195-96 (5th Cir. 2002) C'[A]
communication constitutes 'express advocacy'-and may therefore be subject to mandatory
disclosure regulations-only if it contains explicit words advocating the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110
F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1997) (calling for bright-line test using "magic words," stating, "the
Federal Election Campaign Act could be applied consistently with the First Amendment only
if it were limited to expenditures for communications that literally include words which in
and of themselves advocate the election or defeat of a candidate"); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "express advocacy" is speech that
"must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible
of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate"); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616
F.2d 45, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (calling for bright-line test requiring "magic words" contained
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52, such as "vote for" or "vote against," not words that
are "express or implied, of encouraging election or defeat"). For a discussion of the
ramifications of the "magic words" doctrine, see Scott E. Thomas & Jeffirey H. Bowman, Is
Soft Money Here to Stay Under the "Magic Words"Doctrine?, 10 STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 33, 35-
42 (1998).
" President Clinton signed the Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477
(2000) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 527 (2001)), adding disclosure provisions to section 527. The
legislation passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 385-39 and the Senate by a vote
of 92-6. 146 CONG. REC. S6047 (daily ed. June 29, 2000); 146 CONG. REC. H5289-90 (daily ed.
June 27, 2000). Congress chose not to require other 501(c) organizations (e.g., section
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(5) labor organizations, or section 501(c)(6)
business leagues) to disclose their contributors. 146 CONG. REC. H5288 (daily ed. June 27,
2000) (statement of Rep. Doggett). It appears that there was not support in Congress for
extending the disclosure provisions to other 501(c) organizations, so the disclosure provisions
only apply to section 527 political organizations. See also Recent Legislation, Campaign
Finance Reform-Issue Advocacy Organizations-Congress Mandates Contribution and
Expenditure Requirements for Section 527 Organizations, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2214-15
(2001) (arguing that disclosure provisions should apply to all 501(c) organizations). The
requirements do not apply to political organizations that already report under FECA, nor do
they apply to organizations that receive less than $25,000 in gross receipts. I.R.C. § 527(i)(5),
(i)(6), ()(5) (2000). Some scholars have argued that section 527 organizations will simply
reorganize as 501(c)(4) organizations to avoid the disclosure provisions in section 527. Hill,
supra note 9, at 400; Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and
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B. TYPES OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
The tax code provides some type of tax-exempt status for more
than twenty-seven different types of entities. 2 A tax-exempt
organization is exempt from tax on income related to its tax-exempt
purpose. 3 Investment income or income not related to the exempt
purpose of the organization, known as "unrelated business income,"
is subject to tax.74 If the organization is a tax-exempt organization
under section 501(c)(3) 71 of the Code, donations to the organization
are tax deductiblee.7  Donations or contributions to other tax-exempt
organizations are not deductible by the donor.
Political organizations are not the only exempt organizations that
engage in political advocacy. Social welfare organizations,77 labor
Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 81 (2002). Although this technique may work
for some organizations, 501(c)(4) organizations are not exempt from gift tax, and influencing
elections cannot be their primary function. See supra note 44. Moreover, if Congress believes
that other exempt organizations are being used as a mechanism to avoid the disclosure
provisions, Congress can extend the disclosure provisions to other exempt organizations.
72 I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000).
7 Section § 501(a) provides that an organization identified in subsection (c) is exempt
from tax. I.R.C. § 501(a). Section 511 of the Code, however, provides for the imposition of tax
on the unrelated business income of an otherwise exempt organization. I.R.C. § 511.
71 I.R.C. § 511.
75 Section 501(c)(3) provides an exemption to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, . . . or
educational purposes ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals ....
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
7 Donations to section 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible by operation of section 170
of the Code. I.R.C. § 170. Section 170 provides for the deduction of charitable contributions.
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). Charitable contributions are defined by section 170(c) of the Code as,
among other things, a donation to a "corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(B). This definition closely parallels the definition for an exempt organization under
section 501(c)(3) of the Code. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 170(c)(2)(D) provides that no
deduction is allowed for contributions to an organization that fails to qualify as a section
501(c)(3) organization because it attempts to influence legislation or participates in any
political campaign on behalf of a candidate. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
7 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Section 501(c)(4) organizations are:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a
designated person or persons . . . and the net earnings of which are
devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.
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unions,7" and business leagues,79 all may engage in some political
advocacy as long as the political activity is not the organization's
primary purpose."0 Section 501(c)(3) organizations are not permit-
ted to participate directly or indirectly in any political campaign on
behalf of a candidate,81 but they may engage in voter education
activities and attempt to influence legislation as long as it is not a
substantial part of their activities.8 2
Many political organizations did not qualify for tax-exempt status
because they were primarily involved in political advocacy. These
organizations also did not fit the traditional mold of a for-profit
partnership or corporation. Congress's solution was to create a tax-
exempt entity under section 527 for organizations whose primary
purpose was to influence elections.83  The tax-exempt status of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A).
7s See I.R.C. § 501(c)(5). Section 501(c)(5) organizations are "[l]abor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations." Id.
'9 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). Section 501(c)(6) organizations are "[business leagues, chambers
of commerce, real-estate boards... not organized for profit and no part of net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Id.
0o See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (providing that
organization qualifies as section 501(c)(4) organization if"it is primarily engaged in promoting
in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community"); Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (providing that "the promotion of social
welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns
on behalf ofor in opposition to any candidate for public office"); see also Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-
1 C.B. 332 (providing that section 501(c)(4) organization may participate in political campaign
as long as its primary function is promotion of social welfare).
", Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990) (stating organization is action
organization and does not qualify for section 501(c)(3) status if it "participates or intervenes,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
for public office").
82 No substantial part of a section 501(c)(3) organization's activity may be for "carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation ... and which does not
participate in... any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (noting
organization is action organization and does not qualify for section 501(c)(3) status if
"substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or
otherwise"). Although section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in
significant political activity, Daniel Simmons argues that section 501(c)(3) and (c)(4)
organizations may still be used as a conduit for campaign activities because the definition of
political intervention is very vague. Simmons, supra note 71, at 107-08. He also points out
that the IRS is often slow to revoke a section 501(c)(3) organization's status. Id. Simmons
suggests creating an excise tax on contributions to a section 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) organization
that are directed to campaign advocacy. Id. at 108.
83 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
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section 527 organizations was modeled after the tax exemption in
section 501(c). Section 527 organizations are exempt from tax on
their exempt function income, which is defined as contributions,
membership dues, and proceeds from political fundraisers.84 They
are, however, subject to tax on investment income or on other
income that is not exempt function income.85
C. CHANGE OF DIRECTION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SURROUNDING THE
PASSAGE OF SECTION 527
Under section 527 prior to the recent changes, organizations
could obtain tax-exempt status while avoiding campaign finance
disclosure provisions in FECA. For tax purposes, an organization
could qualify as a tax-exempt political organization under section
527 by indicating that the purpose of its activities was to influence
the election or nomination of a candidate.86 These organizations
also could avoid FECA's disclosure requirements by claiming that
they were not intending to influence elections because they were
engaged only in "issue advocacy" speech that was not subject to
FECA under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. 7 Since the IRS
has a broad interpretation of when an organization is "attempting
to influence" the election or nomination of any individual," and
84 I.R.C. § 527(c)(3).
85 Id.
8 I.R.C. § 527(e).
87 See H.R. REP. No. 106-702, at 12 (2000):
These reports make clear that section 527 organizations are being used in
ways that were not necessarily contemplated when section 527 was
enacted in 1975. Based on recent IRS rulings, the Committee believes
that the activities of many of these organizations are being limited to
ensure that the organizations are not engaged in express advocacy that
would be reported and disclosed under the Federal election laws. Thus,
the Committee finds that section 527 organizations are being used to
exploit the lack of information reporting and disclosure under the present-
law Federal tax rules. This finding is supported by the fact that the IRS
Statistics of Income data show a clear trend toward increased use of
section 527 organizations in recent years and by the fact that the IRS has
been asked to rule on a number of occasions with respect to section 527
organizations that, by their charter, cannot engage in express advocacy.
Id.
* Revenue Rulings 78-248 and 80.282 set forth the test for determining whether an
activity constitutes participation or intervention in an election campaign. Rev. Rul. 78-248,
2003] ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND SECTION 527 629
federal courts interpreting Buckley have a much more limited
definition, organizations can qualify as political organizations under
the tax code but still be exempt from FECA's disclosure require-
ments.89 This distinction principally occurs because the IRS bases
its determination on whether an organization qualifies as a political
organization on factors that are very similar to the ones it uses to
determine whether a 501(c)(3) organization has violated campaign
restrictions." The IRS's position appears to be that, if the activity
is political enough that a 501(c)(3) organization would be prohibited
from engaging in such conduct, the organization qualifies as a
political organization under section 527. 9" The IRS does not use the
Buckley test to determine whether an organization is attempting to
influence an election. The distinction has created a strange dynamic
where organizations admittedly formed to influence elections claim
to be exempt from FECA because their political advertising does not
1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1,
1996) (discussing facts and circumstances test).
" See Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 35 (2000)
(statement of Joseph Miknit, Tax Legis. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Treasury):
The scope of campaign-related activities [under § 527] is broader than the
definition of "express advocacy" under the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA).... Thus, the section 527 definition of "political organization"
covers not only traditional political parties and candidate committees
subject to regulation under the FECA, but also covers other organizations
(and unincorporated funds) which are organized... primarily to conduct
activities in an attempt to influence an election ... even though these
organizations may not engage in "express advocacy" in the FECA sense.
In other words, section 527 covers "political organizations" that are
commonly referred to as "issue advocacy" organizations for Federal
election law purposes, because such organizations conduct (or fund) biased
voter education efforts, targeted voter-registration efforts, or grassroots
lobbying intended to influence an election.
Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21,
1997).
Senator Lieberman claims that the language in section 527 was designed to cover only
organizations subject to FECA. 146 CONG. REC. S5995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement
of Sen. Lieberman). Under this interpretation, only political organizations that disclosed
contributions and expenditures under FECA would be entitled to tax exempt status.
' In Private Letter Ruling 96-52-026, the IRS explained that the factors that govern
when voting guides cross the line from educating voters to influencing elections in the section
501(c)(3) context also indicate the types of voting guides that would qualify as exempt function
activity under section 527(e)(2). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996); see also Hill, supra
note 9, at 391 (discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026).
"' Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
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attempt to influence the election or nomination of an individual for
public office.92
The advertisement paid for by Republicans for Clean Air was not
unique.93 The following is an excerpt of a television advertisement
paid for by United States Chamber of Commerce that ran during a
judicial election:
ON THE SCREEN: "An American flag is in the back-
ground. The name Jim Smith remains visible through-
out the narration, and the scales-of-justice appears in
the left part of the screen. While the narrator explains
that Jim Smith uses common sense and puts victims'
rights first, the words '96% conviction rate' appear on
the screen."94
SCRIPT: "Judge Jim Smith. He uses common sense
and puts victims' rights first.... As a district attorney
and prosecutor he had a ninety-six percent conviction
rate. As a judge, he understands that victims' rights
come ahead of criminals' rights. Judge Jim Smith. For
ten years on the Rankin County bench he upheld exist-
ing laws, instead of trying to make new ones. And he
carried that same common sense approach to the Su-
preme Court in 1993.... Judge Jim Smith--common
sense on the bench."95
Several entities have sought rulings from the IRS that they qualified as political
organizations by acknowledging to the IRS that their primary objective was to influence
elections. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999). These same organizations were
prohibited in their charters from engaging in express advocacy. Id. These organizations were
considered political organizations under section 527, but presumably were not subject to
FECA. See id. (providing that, because material was biased in its presentation and
admittedly designed to influence elections, organization qualified as political organization);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24,1997) (providing that, although material was educational,
facts indicate that timing, content, and targeting of material was designed to influence
election); Hill, supra note 9, at 387-88 (discussing "the new campaign finance vehicle" based
on section 527 instead of section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4)).
93 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing Republicans for Clean Air
advertisement).
' Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 191 F. Supp. 2d 747,752 (S.D. Miss. 2000), rev'd 288
F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002).
' The Fifth Circuit determined in Chamberof Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 190 (5th
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The Chamber of Commerce claimed that this advertisement was
only issue advertising because it did not expressly advocate the
election of Justice Smith." These so-called issue advertisements
that are really designed to influence elections are prevalent in
elections throughout the United States.97
Congress apparently became frustrated by the fact that political
organizations were not disclosing their contributors or their
expenditures.' Members of Congress were particularly concerned
Cir. 2002), that this advertisement was not express advocacy because it did not "contain
explicit terms advocating specific electoral action by viewers." It is clear from the
advertisement, however, that the Chamber of Commerce was advocating the election of Judge
Smith and attempting to influence his election. For a thorough discussion of the Moore case
and the full text of the Smith advertisement, see generally Foley, supra note 13. Because
section 527 does not apply to section 501(c)(6) organizations (business leagues), the disclosure
provisions in section 527 would not prohibit the Chamber of Commerce from running similar
advertisements without disclosure. I.R.C. § 527. The recently passed McCain-Feingold
campaign finance reform measure might require disclosure. Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-90 (2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §
434(a)). McCain-Feingold requires disclosure of "electioneering communication," which is
defined as communication identifying a candidate for Federal Office within sixty days of an
election. Id. § 201(a). Since this definition only applies to federal elections, the Chamber
could run anonymous advertisements in local elections. McCain-Feingold contains a "fall
back" definition in case the main definition is determined to be unconstitutional. Id. The fall
back definition defines electioneering communication as "any broadcast, cable or satellite
communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes
a candidate for that office... and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than
an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id.
' See Moore, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 (detailing Chamber of Commerce's position), rev'd
288 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002).
7 See JAMIESON ET AL., supra note 2, at 14 (indicating that during 2000 election cycle
94% of televised issue spots aired within sixty days of the election made case for or against
candidate); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions
and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLAL. REV. 265,265 (2000) (referring
to issue advertisements as "sham issue advocacy").
9 H.R. REP. 106-702, at 12 (2000); see also 146 CONG. REC. S5995 (daily ed. June 28,
2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman):
These groups exploit a recently discovered loophole in the tax code that
allows organizations seeking to influence federal elections to fund their
election work with undisclosed and unlimited contributions at the same
time as they claim exemption from both Federal taxation and the Federal
election laws.... [A] number of groups engaged in what they term issue
advocacy campaigns and other election related activity recently began
arguing that the near identical language of FECA and section 527 actually
mean two different things. In their view, they can gain freedom from
taxation by claiming that they are seeking to influence the election[s] of
individuals to Federal office, but may evade regulation under FECA, by
asserting that they are not seeking to influence an election for Federal
office. . . . [Newly formed 527 organizations pushing the agenda of
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that section 527 political organizations were exempt from paying
taxes and were receiving a Government benefit, but their existence
could remain a secret.99 Section 527 organizations were not required
to file any documents with the IRS unless they had income unre-
lated to their exempt function."° Members believed that the current
system of allowing secret tax-exempt organizations to be involved in
secret electioneering threatened the integrity of the democratic
process.
Senator Lieberman, a sponsor of the legislation, expressed his
fear that:
None of us should doubt that the proliferation of
these groups-with their potential to serve as secret
slush funds for candidates and parties, their ability to
run difficult-to-trace attack ads, and their promise of
anonymity to those seeking to spend huge amounts of
money to influence our elections-poses a real and
significant threat to the integrity and fairness of our
elections....
The risk posed by the 527 loophole goes even farther
than depriving the American people of critical informa-
tion. I believe that it threatens the very heart of our
democratic political process. Allowing these groups to
operate in the shadows pose[s] a real risk of corruption
political parties are using the ability to mask the identities of their
contributors as a means of courting wealthy donors seeking anonymity in
their efforts to influence our elections.
Id.
146 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Houghton).
10o Prior to the amendments to section 527 in 2000, political organizations were required
to file a Form 1120-Pol if they had investment income and exempt function expenditures over
$100. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(6) (2000). The 1120-Pol is a one-page form that does not require
disclosure of contributors or expenditures. I.R.S. Form 1120-Pol, U.S. Income Tax Return for
Certain Political Organizations (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-fill/fl120pol.pdf
(last visited Jan. 22, 2003). Morever, the form is not disclosable to the public. See I.R.C. §
6103(a) (barring disclosure of returns and return information); 146 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily
ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Coyne) ('[S]ection 527s operate in total secrecy outside
the view of the public. These organizations do not apply for tax-exempt status with the
Internal Revenue Service nor file annual returns with the IRS describing their activities and
contributors.").
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and makes it difficult for us to vigilantly guard against
that risk. °1
In order to close what reformers perceived as a loophole in
campaign finance law, Congress amended section 527 to require
political organizations to file with the IRS and to make disclosures
similar to those required of organizations covered by FECA.1 °2
D. HOW SECTION 527'S DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS OPERATE
There are at least three possible ways to interpret section 527's
disclosure provisions.10 3  The Government's interpretation views
section 527 as an elective provision with two main attributes.
1 0 4
Under this interpretation, section 527(i) provides organizations with
a choice whether they want the benefits of section 527 tax-exempt
status or not. If the organization seeks the benefit of tax-exempt
status under section 527, it must file a designation to that effect
with the Secretary of Treasury.0 5 If an organization fails to file an
election to be a political organization under section 527, the
'0' 146 CONG. REC. S5995 (daily ed. June 28, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
'" Joseph Lieberman, Campaign Finance, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 5, 7-8 (1999) (stating tax
treatment of groups with section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) status reflects Congress's judgment
that tax subsidy should not extend to organizations that primarily engage in political
campaign work unless those organizations comply with regulation of election laws).
"o The interpretation of how section 527 operates is currently being litigated in federal
court. See Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1304-
05 (S.D. Ala. 2002) ("NFRA"), appeal docketed, No. 02-16283CC (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs
include the National Federation of Republican Assemblies, the Alabama and Mobile
Republican Assembly, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and Political Action
Committee, the Libertarian National Committee, and Paul Haughton. Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint 1 67-68, Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (No. 00-0759-RV-C) (claiming section 527 unlawful), available at
http://www.527fund.com/complaint.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002); Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5-6, Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (No. 00-0759-RV-C). The dispute mainly involves
whether organizations that influence the election of a candidate must comply with section
527, or whether compliance is only necessary if an organization wishes to obtain the benefits
of tax-exempt status.
"o' Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No. 00-0759-RV-C).
106 I.R.C. § 527(i) (2000). An organization meets this requirement by filing Form 8871,
which is the Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status, with the IRS. Rev. Rul.
2000-49, 2000-2 C.B. 430.
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organization is taxed on its otherwise exempt function income. 1°'
Once an entity registers as a section 527 organization, the entity
must file quarterly °7 or semi-annual'0 reports, and disclose its
expenditures and contributors,"o in order to be exempt from paying
federal taxes. Specifically, subsection (j)(3)(A) conditions the
exemption from tax on the disclosure of the amount of each
expenditure of $500 or more, and the name and address of the
person to whom the payment was made."' Also, subsection (j)(3)(B)
' I.R.C. § 527(c)(3), (i)(4). The Code defines exempt function income to include, among
other things, amounts received as a contribution of money or other property, membership
dues, or proceeds from a political fundraiser. I.R.C. § 27(c)(3). Congress has therefore in
effect nullified Revenue Ruling 74-21 for political entities that choose not to file for exempt
status under section 527. See Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
107 I.R.C. § 527(j)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (III) (requiring political organization to file quarterly
report, pre-election report, and post-general election report in calendar year of regularly
scheduled election).
'0 I.R.C. § 527(j)(2) (2002). The organization makes this disclosure by filing Form 8872,
Political Organizations Reports of Contributors and Expenditures, Rev. Rul. 2000-29, 44
I.R.B. 430. It is unclear how important the disclosure of expenditures is in the campaign
context. Section 317 of Title 47 and the accompanying regulations, 47 C.F.R. 73.1212,
currently require political television advertisements to carry the name of the sponsor of the
advertisement. Therefore, section 527s should already be subject to disclosure when they
expend funds on TV advertising. Since this is the major way section 527s influence federal
elections, they are already disclosing their major expenditures. To the extent organizations
are using aliases to cover their true identity, the statute or FCC rule could be modified to
require more accurate reporting. See 47 C.F.R. 73.1212 (requiring licensedbroadcast stations
to identify the sponsors of paid advertisements). See also Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing an extensive history of section 317 and in dicta recognizing that
the statute was constitutional); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)
(upholding over First Amendment challenge statute upon which section 317 was based that
required second-class mail to identify advertisements).
I.R.C. § 5270)(2). The organization makes this disclosure by filing Form 8872, which
is the Political Organization Report of Contributors and Expenditures. Rev. Rul. 2000-49,
2000-2 C.B. 430. It is unclear how important the disclosure of expenditures is in the
campaign context. 47 U.S.C. § 317 and the accompanying regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212
(2001), currently require political television advertisements to carry the name of the sponsor
of the advertisement. Therefore, section 527 political organizations should already be subject
to disclosure when they expend funds on TV advertising. Since this is the major way that
section 527 political organizations influence federal elections, they are already disclosing their
major expenditures. To the extent organizations are using aliases to cover their true identity,
the statute or FCC rule could be modified to require more accurate reporting. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1212(a)(1), (2) (2001) (requiring licensed broadcast stations to identify the sponsors of
paid advertisements); see also Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1913)
(upholding over First Amendment challenge statute upon which section 317 was based that
required second-class mail to identify advertisements); Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1449-
57, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing extensive history of section 317, and in dicta recognizing
that statute was constitutional).
"o I.R.C. § 527j)(3)(A). Expenditure is defined as "a payment, distribution, loan, advance,
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conditions the exemption from tax on the disclosure of the name and
address of each contributor who contributed an aggregate amount
of $200 or more to the organization during the calendar year."'
If an entity has elected to be a section 527 political organization
and it fails to disclose under subsection (j), the entity is taxed on the
amount "to which the failure relates." 12 Under the Government's
interpretation of the statute, an entity can elect to be a section 527
organization and disclose either all, some, or none of its contributors
and expenditures."' Under subsection (j), the entity is taxed on
those contributions or expenditures that it failed to disclose.114
The plaintiffs in National Federation of Republican Assemblies
v. United States ("NFRA")," 5 however, argue that all entities, even
those that choose to opt-out under section 527(i), are subject to the
deposit, or gift, of money, or anything of value." I.R.C. § 527(e)(4) (referencing I.R.C. §
271(b)(3)). If applied literally, this definition would require the disclosure of amounts spent
to purchase office equipment.
.' I.R.C. § 5270)(3)(B). Contribution is defined as "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit, of money, or anything of value." I.R.C. § 527(e)(3) (referencing I.R.C. § 271(b)(2)).
The information required in these reports is almost identical to the information required in
reports made by organizations pursuant to FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (2000) (listing report
requirements under FECA).
n2 I.R.C. § 527(j)(1). Plaintiffs in National Federation of Republican Assemblies contend
that they are not just subject to tax on the nondisclosed amount, but are subject to criminal
penalties as well. See Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103,
at 6.
1"3 Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. U.S., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No. 00-0759-
RV-C).
114 26 U.S.C. § 527(j)(1) (2000). There is some question whether these organizations can
be subject to criminal penalties for failing to file a report. Section 7203 of the Code provides
that any person who fails to supply information required by law or regulations is guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to a fine of $25,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year. 28
U.S.C. § 7203 (2000). Thus, if in fact organizations must file these disclosure reports, the
failure to do so may subject them to criminal penalties. See Rev. Rul. 2000-49, 2000-2 C.B.
430 (stating that political organization is required to give notice that it is political
organization as described in section 527). But see 146 CONG. REC. 55996 (daily ed. June 28,
2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (indicating that organizations can continue to do what
they are doing without disclosing contributions or expenditures, although they would have
do so without the tax subsidy under section 527). The IRS recently has released several
statements indicating that the requirements in section 527 only apply to organizations that
wish to be tax exempt. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-34, 2002-21 I.R.B. 990 (To be tax exempt, a
political organization. .. must file Form 8871."); I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS 2002-11 (May 2002)
C'The filing requirements. .. apply to those political organizations that.., wish to be exempt
from federal income tax provisions.").
"5 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
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disclosure provisions in subsection 0).116 They contend that the
disclosure provisions are therefore mandatory on all entities
meeting the definition of a political organization."17
A third option, not advocated explicitly by either party, is that an
entity has a choice whether to opt into the regulatory scheme or not.
If an entity opts-out, its income is taxed. If it opts-in, it agrees to
comply with the regulatory requirements of the section and must
disclose all contributions and expenditures. Thus, subsection (0)
applies to political organizations that file with the secretary under
subsection (i), but not to other organizations that choose to opt-out
and pay the tax due under subsection (i)(4). Under this interpreta-
tion, subsection (j) operates as a penalty to those organizations that
opt-in but fail to disclose specific contributions or expenditures.
Thus, organizations have a choice whether to opt-in, accept tax-
exempt status, and comply with the disclosure provisions in section
527, or to opt-out, pay tax on their income, and not disclose their
contributors or expenditures. Organizations may not choose to opt-
in and then disclose only some contributions or expenditures. If
they do, they will be subject to a penalty under subsection (j).
II. CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO USE THE TAX CODE TO
REGULATE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Litigants on both sides of the issue have argued whether the
recent amendments to section 527 pass constitutional muster, and
the courts are currently considering that question."' The litigation
mainly involves the intricacies of the specific wording of the statute.
For example, plaintiffs contend that compliance with the statute is
mandatory, that they are subject to criminal penalties, and that no
real tax subsidy is present so the tax provisions operate as a
penalty."9 A discussion of the proper interpretation of the statute
and specific meaning of words in the statute is outside the scope of
this Article. 120 The question addressed here is whether Congress
..6 Id. at 1308.
117 id.
"' Id. at 1306-07.
1 Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 2-3, 7-10.
'20 For a detailed explanation of the district court opinion in NFRA see generally Donald
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could have written a statute that would have accomplished its goals,
and more broadly, whether the tax code can be used as a way to
require disclosure of tax-exempt political organizations. 121
In Part II, this Article examines Congress's power to use the tax
code as a mechanism for regulating political organizations.122 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that non-content based
regulation of tax-exempt entities is permissible and that no entity
has a right to a tax deduction. 123 Under this line of cases, Congress
has the power to regulate tax-exempt entities and condition their
exempt status on meeting certain administrative requirements.
Moreover, exempt and nonexempt entities are routinely required to
disclose information to ensure that the organizations are not
violating statutory requirements of either their corporate or exempt
status. 124 Under this theory, there is no constitutional violation if
Congress conditions a tax exemption on an organization's willing-
ness to accept certain conditions, even if those conditions otherwise
would violate a constitutional right. If this theory is correct, then
the subsidy rationale (i.e., conditioning a subsidy on the acceptance
of other conditions) controls and the First Amendment campaign
B. Tobin, Campaign Finance Disclosure: National Federation of Republican Assemblies, 97
TAx NOTES 407 (2002).
... To the extent the Government's more limited reading of the statute resolves the
constitutional concerns, the statute should operate the way the Government claims it
operates. It is well understood that, when there are two reasonable constructions of a statute,
yet one raises a constitutional question, the Court should prefer the interpretation which
avoids the constitutional issue. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989); Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346.52 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
'2 See infra notes 125-343 and accompanying text.
123 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1991) (stating that power to
discriminate is inherent in power to tax); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 547 (1983) (stating that legislatures possess "great freedom" in taxation classification,
and therefore "the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination"); Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959) (validating nondiscriminatory denials of
deductions).
24 Organizations formed under sections 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Code are required
to file a Form 990 with the IRS. I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2003). Parties filing a Form 990 must disclose, among other things, revenue to the
organization, including "contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts received," and
expenditures of the organization, including grants and allocations, specific assistance to
individuals, professional fundraising fees, legal fees, and the like. Id. The organization also
must disclose its officers, directors, trustees, and key employees. Id.
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finance analysis under Buckley v. Valeo is not implicated when the
Government conditions tax-exempt status on an entity's willingness
to comply with campaign finance regulations.
A. WHAT THE GOVERNMENT GIVETH THE GOVERNMENT MAY TAKETH
AWAY: THE SUBSIDY/PENALTY RATIONALE
The Government is given wide latitude as to classifications
within a duly enacted tax statute, and there is a strong presumption
that tax statutes are constitutional and do not violate the First
Amendment.'25 It is often said that tax deductions and exemptions
are a matter of legislative grace and that Congress is granted
significant leeway in creating tax schemes. 26 While this statement
is simplistic, it forms the baseline from which tax provisions must
be judged.
Tax deductions and exemptions generally operate as a form of
subsidy administered through the tax system, and no entity is
entitled to tax-exempt status.'27 Therefore, the constitutionality of
a tax statute usually is subject to the "rational basis" standard of
review because Congress's decision not to subsidize an organization
through the tax code in no sense burdens that organization's free
speech rights. 2 ' In the tax context, courts have not applied strict
scrutiny when a tax statute impacts speech rights, but instead have
considered whether the tax statute is "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas."'
Since the denial of a subsidy does not burden free speech rights,
the standard campaign finance free speech analysis under Buckley
does not apply when the denial of a tax subsidy is at issue.'30 If the
disclosure provisions in section 527 merely deny a tax subsidy to
organizations that fail to comply with the regulatory structure,
Buckley's First Amendment concerns are never implicated because
'2 Leathers, 499 U.S. at 451; Regan, 461 U.S. at 547.
126 Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308
U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
12 Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450 n.3; Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
" Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,603-04 (1983); Regan, 461 U.S. at 546;
Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
,29 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
1 For a discussion of Buckley, see infra notes 353-413 and accompanying text.
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the disclosure provisions do not infringe the section 527 organiza-
tion's First Amendment rights. 1 ' If the organization does not wish
to be subject to disclosure, it may forgo its tax-exempt status.
In attempting to condition tax-exempt status on a person's
willingness to give up an otherwise established right, Congress is
relying on an argument and line of cases often referred to as the
"greater power doctrine." Under this doctrine, it is constitutional for
the Government to condition the grant of a nonmandatory benefit on
the recipient's willingness to comply with restrictions that otherwise
might be unconstitutional. 2 This doctrine has been used in the tax
context to prohibit section 501(c)(3) organizations from lobbying or
engaging in campaign activities, 3 3 and to prohibit businesses from
deducting lobbying expenses under section 162.' M The "unconstitu-
tional condition" doctrine is a competing doctrine, which provides
that the Government cannot require a citizen to give up a constitu-
tional right in order to receive a benefit, even if the benefit is one
that the Government is not required to provide.'35 In the tax
context, the greater powers doctrine generally has applied except in
181 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 C'We have held in several contexts that a legislature's
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and
thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.").
"2 For an excellent comparison between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the
greater powers approach, see generally Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions
and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1995).
"3 See Regan, 461 U.S. 545-51 (determining that denying tax-exempt status to nonprofit
charity where substantial part of its activities was lobbying did not violate First Amendment
or equal protection clause).
" Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513; see also Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public
Interest- Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1269, 1340 (1993) (arguing that exempt organizations should be permitted to lobby).
'8 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (1988); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (describing
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)
(holding that state may not condition unemployment benefits on employee's willingness to
work on Saturday). See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman,
Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The
Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Laura M. Friedman, Note, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional




the most extreme circumstances, and the analysis usually centers
on whether the provision is the denial of a subsidy or a penalty.'36
Congress can condition the granting of a subsidy on the forfeiture of
a right (the "subsidy rationale"), but it cannot penalize an individual
for exercising a right (the "penalty rationale"). 3 '
Several commentators have criticized the subsidy/penalty
distinction, and it is clearly unsatisfying to anyone struggling with
the competing constitutional doctrines of "greater power" and
"unconstitutional conditions."'38 It often is difficult to determine
whether something is a penalty or a subsidy, and the distinction
often appears to be whether the court agrees or disagrees with the
substantive policy at issue in the case.3 9 It is clear, however, that
a provision providing greater "choice" to a recipient has a greater
likelihood of being considered a "subsidy" than a provision that
provides less choice. Moreover, a subsidy that is narrowly tailored
to the benefit received also stands a better chance of success. Thus,
the disclosure provisions in section 527 have a greater chance of
being considered a subsidy that is constitutional under the greater
powers doctrine if (1) they provide a clear tax benefit to the
recipient, (2) the denial of the subsidy is narrowly tailored to the
benefit received or the provisions provide a clear opt-out option for
entities that chose not to accept the subsidy, and (3) they do not
attempt to regulate the specific content of the speech. Provisions
that meet these requirements are less likely punitive in nature and
more likely designed so that Congress will not subsidize activities
that it believes are unworthy. Congress likely could design a
campaign finance disclosure provision that complies with each of
these three conditions, and that requires exempt organizations to
disclose contributions to and expenditures of the organization.
" See Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
"7 Id. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (finding tax-exemption for veterans
who sign loyalty oath as unconstitutional penalty).
' See supra note 135 and see infra note 283.
" Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 174-75 (1996) ('The doctrines
have become formalistic labels for conclusions, rather than useful tools for understanding.");
see generally Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1995) (comparing unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and greater powers approach).
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1. Section 527 Organizations Receive a Tax Subsidy. First, in
order for the subsidy doctrine to apply, political organizations that
file and are granted section 527 tax-exempt status must receive a
concrete financial subsidy in exchange for agreeing to be bound by
the disclosure provisions. While the grant of tax-exempt status is
not identical to the payment of a subsidy, the Court has treated tax
exemptions, deductions, and credits in a manner similar to the way
it treats direct payments from the Government. 4 ' For example, in
both Cammarano v. United States.. and Regan v. Taxation With
Representation," the Court recognized that the granting of a tax
deduction and the granting of tax-exempt status are Government
subsidies that are administered through the tax code.'
The finding of a tax subsidy in Cammarano and Regan is
particularly instructive on the question whether a tax subsidy exists
in the section 527 context. The finding of a tax subsidy is intuitive
when one considers tax expenditures, since tax expenditures, by
definition, are the cost to the Government of providing specific tax
benefits that reduce the general tax base. 44 A tax expenditure, such
as the deduction for home mortgage interest, provides a direct
subsidy to the taxpayer.
"4 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 540, 544 (1983) ("A tax
exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant."). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax
"Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARv. L. REV. 379, 433
(1998) (arguing that tax benefits are not always equivalent to direct expenditures and that
their similarity should be determined on case-by-case basis).
" 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
142 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
" Cammarano, 538 U.S. at 508-09; Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
'" The idea that tax deductions, exemptions, and credits are similar to Government
spending has given rise to the term "tax expenditure." The cost to the Treasury due to the
various tax deductions, exemptions, and credits is known as tax expenditures. See JOINT
COMM. ONTAXATION OFTHE 107TH CONG., STUDY OFTHE OVERALL STATE OFTHE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 68-69 (2001) ("[T]ax expenditures can be viewed as
government spending programs that are embedded in the tax laws."); see also STANLEY S.
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 2-4 (1985) (discussing tax expenditure
concept); RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TA DICTIONARY 776 (2000) (defining tax expenditure
as "a diminution in government tax revenues that results from tax benefits granted for policy
reasons and that diminish a comprehensive tax base"); Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Reform
179-80 (1973) (discussing tax expenditure concept); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A
Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1155 ('The concept of 'tax expenditures' holds that
certain provisions of the tax law are not really tax provisions, but are actually government
spending programs disguised as tax language.").
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The determination that a tax subsidy exists is far more problem-
atic when one is considering a tax provision that is not a direct
subsidy and does not reduce what is generally thought to be the tax
base. In Cammarano, for example, the "subsidy" at issue did not
involve a tax expenditure, but instead involved a tax deduction
normally thought to be necessary to clearly reflect taxable income. 145
In Cammarano, two taxable entities involved in beer distribution
sought to deduct, as ordinary and necessary business expenses,
amounts paid to organizations whose purpose was to urge the defeat
of initiatives that would have restricted liquor sales. 146 The Court
rejected the taxpayers' argument and held that the denial of an
ordinary and necessary business expense was merely the denial of
a subsidy. 1
47
The Court's conclusion in Cammarano, that the ordinary and
necessary business deduction is a subsidy, 48 is very troublesome.
It is far from clear that the denial of an ordinary and necessary
business deduction is really the denial of a subsidy. 149 The tax code
generally does not tax the gross income of a business, but instead
provides for a tax on the business's net income. To the extent that
tougher liquor laws directly impacted taxpayers' businesses, the
expenses they paid on lobbying were directly related to their
potential income. They were clearly a cost of doing business, the
deduction of which was necessary in order to clearly reflect the
businesses' income.
The Regan case was far clearer because the entity involved in
Regan was a tax-exempt entity under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code."5 It therefore received both the benefit of tax-exempt status
and the secondary benefit that deductions to it were deductible by
" Camarrano, 358 U.S. at 501.
" Id. at 500-01.
147 Id. at 504-05.
148 Id.
"' See George Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and
Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 801,838-41 (1968) (arguing subsidy
rationale in Cammarano is unsatisfactory because both denial of deduction and imposition
of tax restrict free speech and act as penalty for that speech).
"" Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983).
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the donor. 5 ' The Court, therefore, had no problem finding that a
tax subsidy existed in that instance. 52
Cammarano and Regan set a fairly low bar for establishing the
presence of a tax subsidy. Section 527 political organizations are
tax-exempt organizations with a tax status similar to that of the
section 501(c)(3) organization in Regan, except that contributions to
a section 527 organization are not tax deductible."' Based on
Cammarano and Regan, the granting of exempt status in and of
itself would seem to be enough to find the presence of a tax subsidy.
But in order for a tax subsidy to exist, the exempt organization must
not just be exempt from tax, it also must receive some specific tax
benefit due to its exemption. If, for example, the organization had
no taxable income, granting it exempt status would not provide any
Government subsidy because it would have had no income tax
liability. 54 In order to determine whether a subsidy exists, it is
important to consider the tax baseline. Once a tax baseline is
established, one can then determine whether an exempt organiza-
tion receives a tax subsidy as compared to that baseline.
For purposes of this analysis, this Article is concerned with
whether the exempt organization receives a tax benefit due to its
exempt status. Since Congress has the authority to establish the
general rules of taxation, the possibility of a subsidy ultimately
must be measured against what Congress has the authority to do,
not what it should do. Therefore, the ultimate question whether a
tax subsidy exists must be analyzed based on whether the tax-
exempt organization receives a tax benefit, as compared with
151 Id.
's' Id. at 543-44.
' I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
... See Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1290-91
(1969) (arguing that religious organizations would not generally have been subject to income
tax even if they were not exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3)); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax
"Benefits" for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular
Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 807 (2001) 'max exemption does not subsidize churches, but
leaves them alone."). But cf. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the
Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1381-89 (1991) (arguing that donative
theory should be used to explain charitable exemption); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for
Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58-61




current law, due to its exempt status. This tax baseline will be
referred to as the "status-quo baseline." '155 Under this method,
existing congressional enactments create the baseline from which
one views the benefits of tax-exempt status.
In determining whether a section 527 exempt organization
receives a tax subsidy due to its exempt status, there are two
possible tax events to consider. First, the exempt organization may
receive contributions or payments from third parties. If these
payments constitute income, but are not taxed because of the
organization's exempt status, the exempt entity receives a tax
subsidy. Second, political organizations may receive a tax subsidy
because contributions or payments made to section 527 organiza-
tions are not subject to gift tax.156
B. PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION ARE INCOME
FOR TAX PURPOSES
Gross income under section 61 of the Code is defined broadly as
"income from whatever source derived." 5 7 Under this expansive
definition, payments to a political organization would be income.
There are several tax theories, however, including a conduit and
capital contribution theory that could potentially be used to argue
that payments received by political organizations should not
constitute income to the organizations. Each of these theories fails
to provide sufficient justification for excluding the payments from
income.
1. Conduit Theory. Under the conduit theory, the payments to
political organizations are not considered income because the
organizations are merely acting as conduits for spending that a
taxpayer could have made herself.'" Two similar arguments, the
"s An alternative baseline, the tax theory baseline, which considers what should and
should not be included in income based on general tax principles and theories, also could be
used. The tax theory baseline is not concerned with Congress's power to alter the baseline,
or with specific congressional enactments that do so. Under this approach, one would look
to see if a tax subsidy exists due to an organization's exempt status as measured against
general tax principles and theories.
5 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (2000).
157 I.R.C. § 61.
15 Simmons, supra note 71, at 98.
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pooling theory and the trust theory, exemplify this approach. 59
Under the pooling theory, when individuals make post-tax payments
to a political organization, the political organization is viewed
merely as the collector of the individual payments. 6 ° As such, the
payment would be no different than if the individuals themselves
made part of the payment for the specific political activity at issue.
Clearly, ten people each could pay for one-tenth of the cost of a
political advertisement without any entity (except the television
station) being involved.
The trust theory relies on the view that payments to a political
organization can be viewed as contributions that the payor expects
will be used in a certain manner on her behalf. 6' The payments
would then be held in "trust" in a way that limits the organization's
use of the funds.6 2 In that context, the organization would be
expending funds for the payor at her discretion, so the payment
would remain hers and would not constitute income to the political
organization.
Prior to the passage of section 527, the IRS arguably endorsed
the conduit theory as a basis for excluding payments to political
organizations."6 " Recently, however, the IRS has examined the
conduit theory in the context of a charitable organization that lost
its exempt status and concluded that the conduit theory does not
justify excluding contributions from gross income. 64 The IRS
concluded that, since public charities exercise considerable discre-
tion and control of the contributed funds, they are not merely a
conduit for the payments.'65 The IRS concluded that charities
exercise more than ministerial power over donated funds and that
the donations, once made, are controlled by the charity, not the
'59 Id. at 96-101.
'60 Id. at 98.
161 Id.
162 Id.
"' See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,499 (Feb. 8, 1974) (claiming precise justification for
excluding political campaign contributions from gross income has never been clearly
articulated, but that it is clear that justification is not that contributions are gifts); Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,813 n.32 (Mar. 19, 1990) (claiming conduit or quasi-trust rationale was
reason for exclusion). But see supra note 43 (indicating that contributions were considered
gifts).




donor.'66 The IRS has concluded that the conduit theory is reserved
for situations in which the organization is clearly an agent, and not
the "true owner" of the funds.
1 7
For the same reasons that the conduit theory does not work for
charitable organizations that lose their exempt status, it does not
work for political organizations. In the campaign finance context,
the pooling theory fails because individuals are not merely pooling
money to achieve a specific result. The money is paid to a political
organization to promote that organization and its causes. The
political organization has almost complete control over the use of the
money. The organization can invest it, spend it on salaries or office
equipment, or spend it to influence elections.' Moreover, political
organizations often promote more than one issue or candidate. An
individual may contribute money even though she only supports
some of the organization's activities.
In his recent article, Daniel Simmons argues further that, in the
section 527 context, contributors to section 527 organizations seek
to maximize their influence by associating with other like-minded
payors.'69 The organization is therefore providing a service, and
payments to the organization could be considered compensation for
those services. 70
'" Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 19, 1990) (rejecting conduit or quasi-trust rationale);
see also Nat'l Fed. of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1317
(S.D. Ala. 2002) (rejecting conduit or quasi-trust rationale). The theory works, however, when
money is collected by a for-profit organization and passed along to a non-profit organization.
See Rev. Rul. 58-276, 1958-1 C.B. 23 (stating that money collected by television station in
telethon and given to charity is not taxable income to television station).
107 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 19, 1990).
' As the district court noted in National Federation of Republican Assemblies, political
organizations are not required to give money back to contributors upon dissolution. NFRA,
218 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
" Simmons, supra note 71, at 97.
"0 Id. at 99. In addition, the political organization can be seen as providing a service to
the candidate. If A purchases a product from B and gives it to C, B still has taxable income
from the purchase. Here an individual (A) is purchasing a product from the political
organization (B) for the benefit of C. B is merely providing a service to A for C's benefit.
Contributors are in a sense buying a product, which is the political organization's ability to
influence policy in a manner that the contributor believes is important. See Tech. Adv. Mem.
91-30-008 (Apr. 16, 1991):
Generally, where an organization supports an individual's campaign for
public office, the organization's activities and expenditures in furtherance
of the individual's election or appointment to that office are for an exempt
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The trust theory similarly fails because political organizations
are under no obligation to spend contributors' money in any specific
fashion. Once money is given, it is the political organization that
has dominion and control over the funds, and it may spend them in
any manner it sees fit consistent with its corporate charter.171
2. Capital Contribution Theory. Under section 118(a) of the
Code, contributions to capital are not included in a corporation's
gross income.172 Thus, if a political organization is considered a
corporation, and the payment to it was considered to be a contribu-
tion to capital, the political organization would not have taxable
income on the payment even if the organization was not exempt
under the Code.
Determining whether the payment is a contribution to capital is
difficult in the political organization context because the law
anticipates a payment to a for-profit corporation. One can, however,
extrapolate from those decisions, and apply the for-profit model in
the political organization context. 7 ' The Court has set out a five-
part test for determining whether a payment from a nonshareholder
is a contribution to capital. 74 In order for a payment from a
function of the organization. The individual does not have to be an
announced candidate for the office. Furthermore, the fact that an
individual never becomes a candidate is not crucial in determining
whether an organization is engaging in an exempt function. An activity
engaged in between elections which is directly related to, and supports,
the process of selection, nomination, or election of an individual in the
next applicable political campaign is an exempt function activity.
Id.
171 Simmons, supra note 71, at 98-99.
17 I.R.C. § 118(a) (2000).
' Brown Shoe Co. v. Comm'r, 339 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1950) (holding payments by
community groups to corporation as inducement to locate or expand in their communities
were capital contributions); Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1925) (holding
payment by Cuban Government to railroad to promote construction in Cuba was contribution
to capital). But see United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401,
413-14 (1973) (holding payments from Government funds to railroad for cost of building
railroad facilities were not contributions to capital); Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S.
98, 102 (1943) (holding payments by customers to utility for cost of building power lines were
not contribution to capital).
.74 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413. The Court first held that
payments by nonshareholders could be contributions to capital in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad
Co., 268 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1925). Edwin G. Schuck, Jr., The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
for New Construction: Eligible Basis and Planning Possibilities, 48 TAX LAW. 321, 334 (1995).
The test in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. clarified the Court's holding in Cuba
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nonshareholder to be considered a contribution to capital, it must:
(1) become a permanent part of the transferee's working capital
structure; (2) not be compensation, such as a direct payment for a
specific, quantifiable service provided for the transferor by the
transferee; (3) be bargained for; (4) result in benefit to the trans-
feree in an amount commensurate with its value; and (5) ordinarily,
if not always, be employed in or contribute to the production of
additional income and its value assured in that respect. 7 '
Under this test, payments to political organizations do not qualify
as contributions to capital. The payments are not a permanent part
of the organization's working capital structure. They are received
by the organization and expended on political advocacy. They are
not retained by the organization to enhance its capital structure.
Moreover, the payments are, in some sense, compensation for
services. As previously discussed, the political organization
performs a service for the person who makes the payment. 176 The
political organization engages in political advocacy. In addition, the
payments are not bargained for, and they do not contribute to the
production of income for the organization.
3. Gift Theory. While the conduit and contribution to capital
theories do not provide sufficient reasons for excluding payments to
a section 527 organization from income, neither theory appears to
be the basis for the IRS's determination that payments to a political
organization are not income. It appears from the history behind the
IRS's issuance of Revenue Ruling 74-21,117 which indicates that
contributions to a political organization would not be considered
Railroad. Id. at 335. It is questionable whether the Court was correct in Cuba Railroad in
treating payments by communities to a corporation as contributions to capital. See Thomas
L. Evans, The Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Capital: An Economic Analysis,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1460 n.6 (1992) (noting paradoxical stance that, while corporation may
exclude contributions from income, it is not allowed to enjoy additional benefit of recovering
costs of assets when they are later sold or depreciated). The IRS's position is that, in light of
intervening case law, payments by communities to corporations generally are not contribu-
tions to capital. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,354 (Dec. 21, 1977); see also Schuck, supra at 335.
"' Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413; see also JACOB MERTENS, JR.,
10 THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3830 (2002) (noting defining characteristics of
nonshareholder contributions to capital as established by Supreme Court).
176 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing theory of contribution as
service).
171 Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
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income,17 that the IRS believes that contributions to political
organizations are gifts and therefore not income.'79 This would be
consistent with the IRS's position that, absent a specific provision
in the Code to the contrary, the contributor to the organization must
pay gift tax.' The premise behind the requirement that a payor
pay gift tax is that the donor is not receiving compensation or
adequate consideration in money or money's worth for the contribu-
tion. 18
1
But in determining whether a payment should be included in
income or whether it is a gift for income tax purposes, the test is
whether the payment was given with detached and disinterested
generosity. 8 ' Thus, a donor might be subject to gift tax on a
payment since it was not given for money or money's worth-the
test for estate and gift tax purposes-but the payment still might
not be considered a gift for income tax purposes. To the extent that
the payors are receiving something for their payments, (i.e., the
ability to influence policy or the ability to magnify their voices by
joining together), the gift theory also may fail since the payment
would not have been given with detached and disinterested
generosity.
The notion that the payor to a political organization receives a
benefit in exchange for a payment, thus leading to a finding that the
payment is income for income tax purposes, is supported by cases
rejecting the IRS's position that payments to political organizations
are gifts subject to the gift tax."'8 In Stern v. United States,"" Mrs.
17S Id.
,71 See Tax Treatment of Contributions of Appreciated Property to Committees of Political
Parties, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,427 (Oct. 19, 1972) (Notice of Opportunity to Submit Written
Comments to Request for Public Hearing) (indicating that it is matter of history that IRS has
never required political committees to file income tax returns because it believed that
virtually all of receipts were from gifts); I.R.S. Announcement, 1973-2 C.B. 6-461, 461
(reversing previous position and requiring political parties to file returns, and indicating that
gross income will include interest and dividends but not contributions). But see supra note
43 (indicating IRS based its decision on conduit theory and not gift theory).
" See Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972.2 C.B. 534, 534-35 (indicating that, except in Fifth Circuit
where Stern v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971), was binding precedent, IRS
would consider transfers to political campaigns to be gifts for tax purposes); see also supra
note 43 (discussing evolving classification of contributions).
181 I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2000).
's Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
's Stern v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Carson v.
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Stern, a wealthy investor, was upset that business leaders consis-
tently ranked Louisiana as a poor place to locate their businesses.' 5
She believed that this ranking was due to political corruption in
Louisiana.' 86 Mrs. Stern made large political expenditures and
pooled her money with that of other like-minded individuals.1 7
Mrs. Stern argued that these payments were not subject to gift tax
because they were made to protect her property and her personal
interest by promoting efficiency in Government."'8 The court found
that the political expenditures were made in the ordinary course of
business, for the purpose of protecting her property, and were free
of donative intent.8 9 Specifically, the court found that:
The contributions were motivated by [Stern's] desire to
promote a slate of candidates that would protect and
advance her personal and property interests .... In a
very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern was making an eco-
nomic investment that she believed would have a direct
and favorable effect upon her property holdings and
business interests .... 190
While this holding relieved Mrs. Stern of gift tax liability, it may
have subjected the receiving organization to income tax. If the
payment was made in the ordinary course of business without
donative intent, then the payment should be considered income to
the association since it was not made with detached and disinter-
ested generosity.
Under Stern, payments to political organizations in the ordinary
course of business or for financial reasons would not be considered
Comm'r, 641 F.2d 864,865-66 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding payment was for donor's own economic
advantage and campaign contributions are not gifts within meaning of gift tax law); Jeffrey
Schoenblum, The Changing Meaning of "Gift" An Analysis of the Tax Court's Decision in
Carson v. Commissioner, 32 VAND. L. REV. 641,657-58 (1979) (stating Stern rejected gift tax
treatment on narrow grounds).
'84 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
Iss Id. at 1328.
186 Id.
L87 id.
ISO Id. at 1328-29.
18' Id. at 1329.
'90 Id. at 1330.
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gifts and would be income to the political organization. The problem
with applying the Stern logic to payments to political organizations
is that the question whether a payment is a gift or not for income
tax purposes is a factual analysis based on whether the payment
was made with detached and disinterested generosity. 91 It is
impractical to make such a determination about each contribution
made to a political organization. The difficulty in making this
determination for each donor makes enforcement extremely
burdensome. It does, however, provide a basis upon which Congress
could make the determination that all payments to political
organizations are income for income tax purposes. Congress could
determine that in the political organization context payments are
rarely made with detached and disinterested generosity. Recogniz-
ing that collection efforts would be difficult under the present test,
Congress could decide to eliminate the fact-based test and legislate
that payments to political organizations are not gifts for income tax
purposes. Such an action by Congress would change the status-quo
baseline and would clarify that payments to political organizations
are not excludable from income as gifts.
4. Ordinary and Necessary Business Deduction. If a political
organization's contributions are income to the organization, the
political organization still might not have taxable income since the
expenditures might offset its receipts. Under such a circumstance,
the exempt organization would not be receiving a significant tax
benefit due to its exempt status because it would have little taxable
income absent the exemption.
While in theory this might be the result, under the status-quo
baseline, political organizations could not deduct such
expenditures. 9 2 As early as 1915, a U.S. Treasury Department
regulation prohibited businesses from deducting lobbying expenses
as ordinary and necessary business expenses.'93 This regulation
' Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289-91 (1960).
.9 The result might be different if a tax theory baseline were used. Since in theory the
political organization is in the business of influencing elections, its advertising expenses
would be ordinary and necessary business expenses. Thus, if measured against the tax theory
baseline, the exempt organization receives little tax benefit since very little of its income
would have been subject to tax absent exempt status.
'9 T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 57-58 (1915).
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was upheld, albeit in a different form, by the Supreme Court in
Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,19 4 on the grounds
that contracts "to spread such insidious influences through legisla-
tive halls have long been condemned," and that it was within agency
rule-making authority to draw a line between legitimate business
expenses and "those arising from that family of contracts to which
the law has given no sanction."195
In 1962, Congress amended section 162(e) and allowed businesses
to deduct expenses related to legislation "of direct interest" to the
taxpayer.196 In 1993, however, Congress once again amended
section 162(e), which now prohibits any deduction for most expenses
incurred to influence legislation or political campaigns.'97 Section
162(e)(5)(A) allows an organization in the business of influencing
legislation to deduct payments made directly on behalf of another
person, but subsection (e)(5)(A) only applies to direct lobbying on
behalf of a specific client. 9 ' Section 162(e)(5)(A) is not relevant in
the political organization context where the political organization is
acting to promote its own agenda and the agenda of its members.' 9
194 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
' Id. at 338-39.
' Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 960, 973 (1962). Section 276
also prohibits the deduction of amounts spent on political advertisements if the advertise-
ments inure to the benefit of a political party or candidate. I.R.C. § 276(a)(1) (2000).
'9 I.R.C. § 162(e); see also Geary v. Comm'r, 235 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that San Francisco police officer could not deduct as ordinary and necessary business
expenses amounts he paid to promote ballot initiative that would have allowed him to
continue to patrol with puppet that he claimed he used to promote community relations).
' I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(A).
'" The logic of section 162(e)(5)(A) is that the third party was prohibited from deducting
the payments when they were made to the political organization and that disallowance would
produce double taxation. H.R. REP. No. 103-213 pt. 4, at 610 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1299; see also Simmons, supra note 71, at 100-01 (suggesting another
justification for denying ordinary and necessary business expense deduction, namely that
payments at issue are capital expenditures because they create future benefits). Although
advertising usually is deductible despite its long-term benefits, such a policy contradicts the
basic tax theory that items that produce long-term benefits should be capitalized. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-20(a)(2) ('Expenditures for institutional or 'good will' advertising which keeps the
taxpayer's name before the public are generally deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses provided the expenditures are related to the patronage the taxpayer might
reasonably expect in the future."). See also Simmons, supra note 71, at 99-100. Simmons
argues that the general rule on advertising should not apply in the political context because
it is designed to produce long-term benefits. Simmons, supra note 71, at 101. Simmons's
approach would create significant accounting problems. What happens if a candidate loses
the race? The advertising would then have no long-term benefit and would be immediately
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Since under the status-quo baseline a nonexempt political
organization would not be allowed to deduct its expenditures on
political advertising as an ordinary and necessary business expense,
a nonexempt political organization would have significant taxable
income. It would have to include all contributions in income and
would not be able to deduct most of its expenses.2"' Providing tax-
exempt status to political organizations, therefore, is a significant
tax subsidy to the organization.
C. CONGRESS MAY REQUIRE THAT GIFT TAX BE PAID ON PAYMENTS
MADE TO A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Even if a political organization is not required to include
payments in income, it still receives a significant benefit in that
contributions to the organization are not subject to the gift tax. As
discussed previously, the IRS subjects contributions to exempt
organizations to the gift tax.2"' Donors to section 527 political
organizations are specifically exempted from gift tax treatment
under section 2501(a)(5). °2 Individuals making payments to exempt
organizations other than section 501(c)(3) and section 527 organiza-
tions that exceed the annual gift tax exclusion amount are subject
to gift tax on the amount that exceeds the exclusion amount.03 In
circumstances such as the Wyly situation discussed in the beginning
deductible. What about an attempt to influence a U.S. House race versus a Senate race?
Would one be amortizable over two years while the other over six? What Simmons's
argument does point out, however, is that, if Congress chose to do so, it could require that a
political organization's campaign expenditures be capitalized over a specific period of time.
'0 The IRS issued guidance regarding the tax treatment of an exempt organization when
its exempt status had been revoked. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 19, 1990). The Service
concluded that contributions to the organization are income, and that the organization was
entitled to deductions for its expenditures. Id. The Service specifically indicated, however,
that expenditures of the organization are not deductible if they are disallowed by the Code.
Id. Applying this treatment to political organizations would have them include contributions
in income, but they would not be able to deduct expenses for political advertising.
2o' See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
0 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (2000).
20m In 2002, a gift of up to $11,000 to any individual in a particular year was exempt from
gift tax. I.R.C. § 2503(b). This amount was adjusted for inflation. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2). If an
individual makes a gift of over $11,000 to any individual or entity, the amount over $11,000
is subject to gift tax. Under section 2505 of the Code, an individual is allowed a credit against
gift tax owed up to $1,000,000. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505. Thus, if a person chooses, she can avoid
paying gift tax and reduce her credit by the amount of the gift tax.
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of this Article,0 4 the exemption from the gift tax provides a
significant financial benefit to individuals contributing to section
527 organizations. Since the ability to make large contributions'to
an organization is one of the major benefits of using an entity not
subject to FECA, the gift tax exclusion provides a significant tax
benefit. Under existing law, payments to section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions are subject to gift tax and that lessens their attractiveness as
a nonregulated campaign entity.0 5
It is far from clear that this benefit is sufficient to implicate the
subsidy rationale used by Congress to support the disclosure
requirements in section 527.20 Because the gift tax is paid by the
payor, there is no direct tax benefit bestowed on the exempt
organization by Congress. The lack of a direct connection between
the tax benefit received and the political organization may defeat
any attempt to use the gift tax as a rationale for the subsidy
argument.
Economically, however, the political organization is the obvious
beneficiary of the gift-tax exemption. Because a payor is exempt
from gift tax, she may be willing to make a larger contribution to a
political organization. The political organization then becomes the
2 See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing advertisement purchased by
supporters of then-Governor George W. Bush).
W See Hill, supra note 9, at 389-90 (indicating that § 501(c)(4) organization sought private
letter ruling confirming that it had created valid § 527 organization, and private letter ruling
was motivated by fact that substantial contributor to 501(c)(4) organization would have been
subject to gift tax on her contribution); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996) (ruling
that gifts made to 527 organization created by 501(c)(4) organization were exempt from gift
tax); Joseph Mikrut, Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax Exempt Organizations: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 40-
41 (testimony of Joseph Mikrut, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury)
(discussing tax treatment under current law for 50 1(c) nonprofits and 527 organizations); Kip
Dellinger, Gift Tax on Political Contributions? A Lousy Idea!, 78 TAX NOTES 621, 621-22
(1998) (arguing that political contributions should not be taxed as gifts); Jonathan Barry
Forman, Taxing Soft Money, 78 TAX NOTES 357, 357 (1998) (arguing that soft money
contributions should be subject to gift tax); Gregory Colvin, Hypothetical Comparison: Major
Donor Support of Advocacy Programs, 18 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 39, 82 (1997) (discussing
501(c)(4) organization seeking private letter ruling that it properly created 527 organization
so major donor could avoid gift tax).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 106-702, at 14 (2000) ("In addition, the Committee believes that
given the tax benefits conferred under present law [including] the benefit of the gift tax
exemption for contributions to section 527 organizations, the public interest is served by
greater public disclosure of information relating to the political activities of such organiza-
tions.").
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direct beneficiary of the tax subsidy. The argument that the
political organization receives a tax subsidy even though the direct
benefit is bestowed on the payor is strengthened by the Court's
discussion in Regan. In Regan, the Court explained that there are
two types of tax subsidies received by section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions: one whereby donations to it are deductible and the other
whereby its income is not subject to tax.2"7 If donations to a section
501(c)(3) organization are considered a subsidy to the organization
because the donor can deduct the payment, then the fact that a
donor is relieved of gift tax when she contributes to a section 527
organization provides an almost identical subsidy to the exempt
organization. Thus, the Court previously has found that a tax
subsidy exists to a tax-exempt organization even though the
organization is not the direct beneficiary of the deduction.208 It is
therefore likely that the benefit/subsidy rationale would apply here
and that exempt organizations would be considered to have received
a tax subsidy since payments to such organizations are exempt from
the gift tax.
D. CONGRESS CAN CONDITION THE BENEFIT RECEIVED ONAN EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
PROVISIONS
Once it is established that a tax subsidy exists, the next factor to
examine is whether the statute properly conditions the benefit
received on compliance with specific regulatory provisions. A
central factor here is conditioning the grant of the subsidy to be
narrowly tailored to the benefit received, and the statute must not
eliminate the organization's ability to engage in unsubsidized
speech. Congress can properly design a statute that meets these
requirements, and the Supreme Court has upheld disclosure
requirements that were required as a condition of receiving a
Government subsidy.
For example, as early as 1912, the Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue whether providing a discounted postal rate could be




conditioned on a requirement that the recipient make certain public
disclosures. In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan,"9 the Court upheld
provisions in the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912210 that
required second class mailers to disclose the names and addresses
of the editor, managing editor, publisher, business managers,
owners (including stockholders), bondholders, and other security
holders.2 ' The Act also required that all advertisements in the
publications be plainly marked as advertisements.212
Although Lewis Publishing is not a tax case, it provides tremen-
dous insight into the application of the subsidy rationale in the tax
context. A postal rate can be seen as a Government fee, similar to
a tax, on people using the postal system. The reduction in the fee
creates a subsidy to publishers in a similar manner to that of a tax
deduction or credit.
The Court rejected the publishers' First Amendment challenge,
holding that in creating a reduced rate (i.e., second class mail) for
publishers, Congress had bestowed a privilege on publishers that
discriminated in their favor.2" 3 The Court determined that the
provision merely affixed conditions upon publishers to receive the
benefits of second class mail status, and that those conditions aided
in determining whether the publications were entitled to the
beneficial status.2" 4 The Court's main justification for upholding the
regulation was that Congress has the right to classify postage rates,
and that the Act's disclosure requirements were within Congress's
authority.1 5 The Court also recognized, however, that the publish-
ers were receiving a benefit from the Government-partially to
increase the "dissemination of current intelligence"-and that the
public had a right to know to whom the Government was providing
the benefit." 8 In fact, the legislative history indicated that one
209 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
210 37 Stat. 539 (1912).
211 Lewis Publ'g, 229 U.S. at 296-97. Disclosure was not required of persons owning less
than 1% of the total amount of stocks, bonds, or mortgages. Id.
212 Id. at 297.
"'a Id. at 303.04. The Court noted that second class mail was eighty times cheaper than
first class mail. Id. at 304.
214 Id. at 314-16.
'15 Id. at 312-13.
216 Id.
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reason Congress required the disclosure was so that the public
would know the people who own and control the entities receiving
the subsidy.217
Very similar justifications can be given for requiring disclosure
in the section 527 context. Just as publishers received a significant
benefit in the form of subsidized mailing, section 527 organizations
receive significant benefits in the form of tax subsidies. To the
extent those subsidies are provided, it is reasonable that the public
know the people who contribute to and benefit from the subsidies.
The Court has applied a similar subsidy rationale when Congress
has chosen not to subsidize through the tax code behavior that
arguably is protected by the First Amendment. 218 For example, in
Cammarano v. United States, 219 which was discussed in the previous
section for the proposition that the granting of a tax deduction is a
subsidy from the Government, 2 1 the Court rejected a First Amend-
ment challenge to a tax statute that prohibited the deduction of
amounts spent by businesses for lobbying for the promotion or
defeat of legislation. 22 ' Two taxable entities involved in beer
distribution sought to deduct, as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, amounts paid to organizations whose purpose was to urge
217 Id. at 312; see also S. REP. No. 62-955, at 24 (1912):
We believe that, since the general public bears a large portion of the
expense of distribution of second-class matter and since these publications
wield a large influence because of their special concessions in the mails,
it is not only equitable but highly desirable that the public should know
the individuals who own or control them.
Id.
218 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450-53 (1991) (upholding general tax that
applied to cable companies even though other media organizations were exempt from tax).
The Court has taken a different approach when the tax provision is specifically aimed at the
press; Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,545-46 (1983) (upholding statute
prohibiting § 501(c)(3) organizations from lobbying); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 512-13 (1959) (upholding regulation denying ordinary and necessary business expense
for amounts spent to defeat legislation). See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn.
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1998) (holding that tax on cost of paper and ink
over $100,000 consumed in production of publications violated First Amendment); Grosjean
v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (finding tax on publications with weekly
circulations above 20,000 unconstitutional).
219 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
220 See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
22 358 U.S. at 498.
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the defeat of initiatives that would have restricted liquor sales.222
Taxpayers argued that the denial of the deduction violated their
First Amendment rights because the denial was based on the
content of their speech.223 The Court rejected this argument and
found that the taxpayers were "not being denied a tax deduction
because they [were] engag[ing] in constitutionally protected
activities, but [were] simply being required to pay for those activi-
ties entirely out of their own pockets."24 The Court recognized that
the denial of a tax deduction for amounts expended to promote or
defeat legislation was plainly not "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas. 225
The Court revisited Cammarano in the exempt organization
context in Regan v. Taxation With Representation.226 Taxation With
Representation (TWR) was a nonprofit organization that sought tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. 27 TWR acknowl-
edged that a major component of its activities would consist of
attempting to influence legislation.22 It sought section 501(c)(3)
status despite the fact that 501(c)(3) specifically prohibits organiza-
tions from attempting to influence legislation.2 '9 TWR claimed that
the prohibition against substantial lobbying was unconstitutional
under the First and Fifth Amendments.3 0
The Court recognized that TWR was not just seeking the right to
lobby, but was explicitly seeking a subsidy in the form of a tax
benefit for its lobbying activities. 231 The Court stressed that both
tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that are
administered through the tax code. 232 The Court concluded that
m Id. at 500-02.
23 Id. at 512-13.
24 Id. at 513.
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
27 Id. at 541.42. The exemption under § 501(c)(3) is far more advantageous than an
exemption under §§ 501(c)(4) or 527 because donations to a § 501(c)(3) organization are
deductible by the donor under § 170. I.R.C. § 170 (2000). Contributions to § 501(c)(4) or § 527
organizations are not deductible by the donor, but the contributions are not taxable as income
to the exempt organization. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4).
' Regan, 461 U.S. at 541-42.
n Id. at 542-43.
230 Id. at 542.
231 Id. at 543-44.
2'32 Id. at 544.
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Congress did not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contribu-
tions for other purposes, nor did it deny TWR any independent
benefit on account of its intention to lobby.283 Instead, Congress
"merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public monies."2 4 The
Court rejected TWR's assertion that it had a right to section
501(c)(3) status and concluded that "[w]e again reject the 'notion
that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless
they are subsidized by the State.' "235
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that the
situation would be different if Congress discriminated invidiously in
the subsidies in such a way as to "aim at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." '236 But the Court concluded that the action here
regulated entities "regardless of the content of any speech they may
use."23 The Court noted that there was "no indication that the
statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration
that it has had that effect."2 Furthermore, the Court explicitly
rejected the notion that strict scrutiny applies whenever "Congress
subsidizes some speech, but not all speech. 239
In Cammarano and Regan, the Court upheld conditions that
Congress placed on tax subsidies. 20 These conditions, however,
were not content based, and they denied a benefit that was closely
associated with the subsidy. In Camrnarano, plaintiffs were not
allowed to deduct business expenses that were spent on political
advocacy, 241 and in Regan, tax-exempt entities were prohibited from
lobbying.242 The Cammarano plaintiffs did not lose their right to
take all business deductions due to their political activities; they
233 Id.
2' Id. at 545.
Id. at 546 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas,
J., concurring)).
m Id. at 548 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959), and quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1985)).
Id.
Id.
'3 Id. at 548-49.
240 Id. at 551; Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
241 358 U.S. at 513.
242 461 U.S. at 545.
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just lost the right to deduct the specific payments that were spent
on political advocacy.248
Regan does not fit cleanly within the Cammarano rationale.
Under the provision at issue in Regan, an entity could lose its
501(c)(3) status completely if it engaged in lobbying.2 44 An entity
would not, as in Cammarano, merely lose its tax exemption for the
specific funds it expended on lobbying. 4 ' The penalty in Regan was
broad and appears not to be narrowly tailored to remove only the
subsidy at issue.
The Court nevertheless found the restriction on lobbying
constitutional.2 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court implicitly
recognized that TWR had another outlet to exercise its First
Amendment rights.2 47  Specifically, the Court noted that TWR's
original structure of two separate organizations-a section 501(c)(3)
organization that was mainly involved in educational activities and
a section 501(c)(4) organization that was involved in influencing
elections-allowed TWR to lobby." Under this structure, the
section 501(c)(3) organization would receive tax deductible dona-
tions, and the section 501(c)(4) organization would not.2 49
23 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. One could envision a statute that denied all ordinary
and necessary business expense deductions to any business involved in political advocacy.
I contend such a statute would be considered a "penalty" since the denial of the subsidy is
overly broad and is not narrowly tailored to the specific behavior that the Government wishes
not to subsidize.
2" Regan upheld the provision in section 501(c)(3) that prohibits 501(c)(3) organizations
from having as a substantial part of their activities attempting to influence legislation.
Regan, 401 U.S. at 541. Since that prohibition was upheld, an organization that attempts to
influence legislation may lose its tax-exempt status. If an organization loses its tax-exempt
status, its income would be subject to tax.
' In Cammarano, the Court upheld regulations prohibiting the deduction of lobbying
expenses under section 162 of the Code. The consequence of running afoul of this prohibition
would be the expenses in question would not be deductible. 358 U.S. at 504-06.
24 Regan, 461 U.S. 550-51.
247 Id. at 544-45.
24 Id. at 543.
24 Id. The concurring opinion stressed that the escape valve of allowing a § 501(c)(3)
organization to lobby through a § 501(c)(4) organization was essential in upholding the
statutory scheme. Id. at 551-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But, the concurrence appears
to ignore the fact that the § 501(c)(4) organization, like the § 527 organization, receives some
subsidies from the Government in the form of a tax exemption, and that Congress also would
have had the power to prohibit § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying.
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In other words, TWR could organize its activities to avoid a broad
sanction for lobbying. By separating into two organizations, TWR
could ensure that it did not lose its entire tax exemption for
engaging in lobbying. Under the scheme suggested by the Court, it
could use donations that were not tax deductible to lobby through a
section 501(c)(4) organization and use tax deductible donations for
its education activities.
250
A statutory scheme that involved an "opt-out" provision similar
to the one in section 527 was examined by the D.C. Circuit in
American Society of Association Executives v. United States."' Prior
to 1993, lobbying expenses could be deducted as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162(e) of the Code.252 In
1993, Congress amended section 162(e) to prohibit organizations
from deducting lobbying expenses.2 However, Congress realized
that exempt organizations-mainly political organizations under
sections 501(c)(4) and 527--could be used as pass-through entities
for lobbying expenses, thereby allowing lobbying expenses to be
deductible.254 For example, the corporation could provide money to
the exempt organization in the form of "membership fees." These
fees arguably would be deductible under section 162 as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. The exempt organization could then
use the funds to lobby Congress. Since the nonexempt organization
could deduct its "membership fees" and the exempt organization
could lobby, absent another change in the law, exempt organizations
could become a conduit for providing a business deduction for
lobbying expenses. Because this is exactly what Congress was
trying to avoid, Congress also provided that the portion of dues paid
to an organization that are attributable to the organization's
2 o Id. at 544.
25' 195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
2' Starting in approximately 1915, businesses were denied deductions for ordinary and
necessary business expenses pursuant to Treasury Regulations. T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec.
Int. Rev. 48, 57-58 (1915). In 1962, Congress passed legislation allowing a deduction under
§ 162 for direct lobbying. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 960, 973
(1962).
" Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13222, 107 Stat. 312,
477 (1993) ("OBRA of 1993").
25 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088,1286; see also Am.
Soc'y of Ass'n Executives v. U.S., 23 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66-68 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing
deductibility of lobbying expenses).
661
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
lobbying expenses would not be deductible by the payor organiza-
tion.25 5 Under the statutory scheme, the exempt organization is
responsible for notifying the taxpayer about the amount of the
membership dues that are not deductible pursuant to section
162(e)(3).256
Congress, perhaps recognizing the burden that these notice
provisions placed on exempt organizations, also provided an
alternative means by which an exempt organization could meet its
obligations." ' Instead of notifying members of the portion of dues
that are not deductible due to lobbying expenses, the organization
could instead pay a "proxy tax"258 of thirty-five percent on the
amount of such lobbying expenses. Presumably the proxy tax is
equal to the benefit the payor organization receives when it is able
to deduct the expense.25 If the exempt organization pays the proxy
tax, the payor organization is entitled to deduct the entire amount
of its membership dues.
The American Society of Association Executives (ASAE) did not
notify members of the amount of membership dues that were spent
on lobbying activities, and instead paid the proxy tax on the amount
of lobbying expenses it incurred.260 ASAE then sued for a refund
arguing that the statute violated the First Amendment.26 ' The court
rejected ASAE's First Amendment challenge, holding that in this
case there was no burden on the First Amendment.262 The court
determined that ASAE could split its organization into two organi-
zations: one that would engage in lobbying and one that would
25 I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2000); OBRA of 1993, 107 Stat. at 477.
2' I.R.C. § 6033(e)(1)(A)(ii).
" See Lee A. Sheppard, The New Etiquette of Lobbying, 60 TAX NOTES 1176, 1179 (1993)
(indicating that representatives of trade associations sought proxy tax because of their
concern that notification provision would be very costly).
25 I.R.C. § 6033(e)(2)(A). This provision is referred to as the "proxy tax" because the
exempt organization is incurring the tax liability as a proxy for its members' ability to deduct
their membership dues.
" This obviously is not a zero sum game in all instances. The corporate tax rate now
ranges from 15% to 35% depending on the income of the corporation. I.R.C. § 11(b). The
payor therefore receives a deduction at its marginal rate, and the exempt organization has
to pay tax on that same amount at 35%.
2'0 Am. Soc'y of Ass'n Executives v. United States, 195 F.3d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 52.
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not.263 This would allow the organization that did not lobby the
opportunity to receive deductible contributions, while denying that
right to the other organization.2"
It is unclear whether the possibility that ASAE could split into
two organizations was necessary for the Government to prevail on
the First Amendment issue, or whether the "proxy tax" provision
was sufficient to create any necessary opt-out option. As far as the
exempt organization is concerned, the proxy tax is an easier, less
intrusive way of reaching the same result as splitting the organiza-
tion into two. If the exempt organization notifies its members
regarding the portion of dues that are not attributable to lobbying,
the member may deduct that portion of the dues. Therefore,
disallowing a deduction on the amount the corporation contributes
has the same effect as it would have if ASAE split into two organiza-
tions.
Regan and ASAE indicate that the ability to opt-out of the
regulatory structure without suffering a greater penalty than the
denial of the subsidy is an important component of upholding a
provision that uses the subsidy rationale in Regan. Having an opt-
out provision and narrowly tailoring denial of the subsidy to the
specific behavior the subsidy encourages are strong indicators that
Congress is merely removing a subsidy and not instituting a
penalty. A provision without such characteristics will have a
greater chance of being characterized as a penalty.
For example, in Speiser v. Randall,"5 the Court struck down a
California law that conditioned a special property tax credit for
veterans on the veteran's willingness to sign a declaration that he
did "not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of California by force or violence or other
unlawful means."2"' The Supreme Court of California construed this
language as denying the tax exemptions only to taxpayers who
engaged in speech that could be criminally punished consistent with
the First Amendment, and for purposes of the case, the Court
Id. at 50.
264 Id.
265 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
266 Id. at 515.
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assumed that the California Supreme Court was correct.2 7 The
Court, however, overturned the California constitutional provision
holding that the procedures set forth were insufficient to protect a
taxpayer's speech.26 According to the Court, the California
constitutional amendment did not adequately protect a taxpayer's
rights in that it placed the burden on the taxpayer to prove he had
not engaged in improper speech. 26 ' The Court reasoned that when
"the right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general
taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencum-
bered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify
its inhibition. 2
70
While the Speiser decision appears to rest on very limited
grounds-that there were not sufficient due process protections to
justify the state policy-the decision was clearly intended to be
much broader. In reaching its conclusion, the Court claimed that to
deny a tax exemption to an otherwise eligible taxpayer solely
because of his speech is in effect penalizing him for the speech. 71
While in Speiser such a penalty may have been warranted because
the speech itself may have been unlawful, the Court nonetheless
found that the state was using the denial of a tax deduction as a
means of punishment.2  The Court also noted that the denial of a
tax exemption for engaging in certain speech "will have the effect of
coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. 2 7' The
Court then claimed that such a denial was aimed at "dangerous
ideas."274
27 Id. at 519-20.fi Id. at 528-29.
N9 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 518.
272 Id. at 519.
273 Id.
" Id. In a series of cases, the Court also has rejected discriminatory taxes on
newspapers, finding that these taxes burden rights protected under the First Amendment.
See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987) (holding Arkansas's tax
on receipts from sales of tangible personal property violated First Amendment by exempting
some, but not all, magazines). The Court believed the tax was particularly repugnant because
the "magazine's tax status dependled] entirely on its content." Id. at 229; Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 576 (1983) (finding that specific tax
imposed only on cost of paper and ink used by newspapers violated First Amendment);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (stating tax on newspaper's gross receipts
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The reasoning underlying the opinion in Speiser poses a signifi-
cant problem for advocates of the subsidy approach to campaign
finance. Since under Speiser the denial of a tax benefit can be a
form of punishment,275 the denial of tax-exempt status can be seen
as a punishment for engaging in political communication. But as we
will see, Speiser was a general punishment for engaging in speech
and was not merely the denial of a specific subsidy tied to a specific
activity.1
6
The Court in Regan and Cammarano implicitly relied on the
greater powers argument and distinguished Speiser, claiming that
"petitioners are not denied a tax deduction because they engage in
protected activities, but instead, are simply required to pay for the
activities out of their own pockets." ' But this distinction is
completely unsatisfying to anyone struggling with these cases.278
Clearly the denial of a subsidy that is conditioned upon the denial
of a right still penalizes the person for engaging in that right.279
Besides pointing out that the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine
may be suspect2" or that the doctrine itself is inconsistently
applied,8 ' the fact that a provision is narrowly tied to the specific
subsidy or provides a way to opt-out of the statutory scheme
from advertising, if newspaper's circulation exceeded 20,000, violated First Amendment); But
cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,445(1991) (holding Arkansas sales tax on receipts that
exempted newspapers but not cable companies was constitutional).
215 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519.
276 See infra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
277 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
2" See George Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and
Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 837 (1968) (arguing subsidy
rationale in Cammarano is unsatisfying because both denial of deduction and imposition of
tax restrict free speech and act as penalty for that speech); Epstein, supra note 135, at 76-80
(explaining that provisions in Regan do not create distortion in political process and that
statute covers full range of activities without subject matter or viewpoint discrimination);
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 174-75 (1996) ("The doctrines have
become formalistic labels for conclusions, rather than useful tools for understanding.").
7 But see Epstein, supra note 135, at 4-8 (asking why there should be any limitation on
scheme that rests on consent of individual whose rights are infringed).
20 See TRIBE, supra note 135, at 681 (indicating unconstitutional conditions doctrine has
been somewhat eroded); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is
an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 620 (1990) (indicating unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has been somewhat eroded).




furnishes another rationale for distinguishing Speiser, where there
was a penalty, from Regan and Cammarano, where there was not.
In a series of cases since Speiser, the Supreme Court appears to
be relying on whether an individual or organization has an alterna-
tive means of engaging in nonsubsidized speech. For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan,"2 the Court indicated that the Government may
limit speech, even in a content-specific way, as long as the Govern-
ment provides a benefit to the recipient and the recipient has an
alternative means of receiving the information.2 3
Rust involved a statute that prohibited organizations that
received Government family planning funds from discussing
abortion as an option.284 The Court noted that the failure to grant
a subsidy for speech was not a penalty; it was merely a decision by
the Government not to subsidize specific speech.2"5 But central to
the Court's decision that the statute was a subsidy and not a
penalty was that the health organization could still provide
counseling about abortion through a separate entity that did not
receive federal funds.2 This opt-out would allow the Government
to guarantee that its funds were not being used for an unintended
purpose, while still ensuring that abortion as a family planning
viewpoint was not restricted. The Court relied on this distinction
despite the fact that requiring that a separate entity be formed to
provide the additional viewpoint is quite an onerous undertaking. 287
28 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
m Id. at 196; see also Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 347-48 (1986)
(validating law conditioning permission of casino to operate on its acceptance of advertizing
restrictions); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government.Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675,685 (1992) (explaining Rust
analysis in unconstitutional conditions framework); Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling
as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1726 (1995) (explaining Rust by looking at counseling as
activity rather than speech).
284 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
2 Id.
2w Id. at 196.
217 The right to condition benefits appears to be even stronger in the tax context where
Congress is granted great leeway in designing a taxation scheme. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.") (emphasis added); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451
(1991) ('Inherent in the power to tax is the power to discriminate in taxation."); Regan v.
Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) ('Legislatures have especially broad
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Since there was still an outlet to engage in unsubsidized communi-
cation regarding abortion, the organization was not penalized for
engaging in such speech.2 8
The Court took a different approach when the subsidy component
could not be severed from the nonsubsidy component. For example,
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez ("LSC'), 8 9 the Court struck
down a funding provision limiting a Legal Services Corporation
lawyer from challenging existing welfare laws.29° Under the Legal
Services Corporation Act, a Legal Services attorney could represent
poor individuals in suits challenging the denial of welfare benefits,
but the attorney could not challenge the validity of existing laws.29'
The Court struck down the provision, holding that Congress "may
not design a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental restric-
tion on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.292
Although the Court distinguished Rust from LSC based on a
public/private speech distinction (in Rust the organization was
speaking for the Government while in LSC the lawyer was repre-
senting a client),93 that distinction is unsatisfying in this context.
The Legal Services lawyer satisfies the Government's interest in
providing legal representation to the poor, just as the medical
provider in Rust satisfies the Government's interest in providing
family planning options to the poor. In neither case was the
recipient actually speaking for the Government.9 4
latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."); Comm'r v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (recognizing "the intention of Congress to tax all gains
except those specifically exempted").
' Similar analysis was used by the Court in Regan. 461 U.S. at 544 (reasoning that §
501(c)(3) organization could still lobby through § 501(c)(4) organization).
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Id. at 538; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400-01 (1984)
(finding that broadcasting station could not segregate its activities with respect to source of
their funding and therefore finding challenged provision unconstitutional).
29' LSC, 531 U.S. at 536-37.
z Id. at 544.
Id. at 541-43.
2w See id. at 554 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("If the private doctors' confidential advice to their
patients at issue in Rust constituted 'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what
subsidized speech would not be government speech. Moreover, the majority's contention that
the subsidized speech in these cases is not government speech because the lawyers have a
professional obligation to represent the interests of their clients founders on the reality that
the doctors in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests of their patients.").
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To the extent that Rust can be distinguished from LSC, the more
important distinction is that between the advisor's ability to provide
abortion counseling absent the subsidy in Rust, and the inability of
the lawyer to do so in LSC. The client in Rust could still receive
significant information from the clinic, she just could not receive all
the information she might need or want. She could, however,
according to the Court, find that information elsewhere.2 95 As the
Court noted in LSC, "[The patient in Rust was not required to
forfeit the Government-funded advice when she also received
abortion counseling through alternative channels." '2 9 While it is
debatable whether alternative channels really existed, since women
visiting family planning clinics may not have been in a position
either economically or emotionally to obtain additional information,
the Government's subsidy of only some of the necessary information
did not prevent alternative channels of information.
By contrast, in LSC, the restrictions at issue prevented the
attorney from providing fair representation to the client. The client
could not bifurcate her representation by having one attorney
represent her nonconstitutional claim and another represent her
constitutional claim. The restriction at issue completely eliminated
the client's ability to receive adequate representation.297
It is this opt-out, or the ability to receive both the subsidized and
nonsubsidized information, that saves section 527's disclosure
provisions from constitutional challenge and distinguishes the
subsidy in Regan from the penalty in Speiser.298 In Regan as in
Rust, the section 501(c)(3) organization was not completely prohib-
ited from speaking, but instead could create a non-501(c)(3) entity
as an outlet for its speech. 299 It could opt-out of the regulatory
scheme and ensure that the Government benefit only went to speech
that did not involve lobbying."° Speiser, on the other hand, could
" Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
29 LSC, 531 U.S. at 547.
2 Id. at 546-47 C'Thus, with respect to the litigation services Congress has funded, there
is no alternative channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict.").
296 See Fudenberg, supra note 132, at 399-402 (distinguishing Regan from Speiser based
on fact that Regan deals with exclusion of benefit while Speiser deals with waiver of right).
29 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-98 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
"o Rust, 173 U.S. at 197-98; Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
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not opt-out of the regulatory scheme."0 1 He could not accept the tax
deduction based on his veteran's status and create a separate entity
with which to express his views against the Government. Speiser
could not bifurcate his speech, nor seek a deduction based on the
ratio of unoffending to offending speech. The ability to opt-out of the
regulatory structure and still engage in nonsubsidized speech is,
therefore, one factor that indicates a provision is a subsidy and not
a penalty.
E. CONGRESS CANNOT ATTEMPT TO USE THE SUBSIDY RATIONALE IN
REGANTO REGULATE THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE SPEECH
Another factor for considering whether a subsidy or penalty
exists is whether the statute attempts to regulate the specific
content of the speech. The statutory scheme at issue in Speiser was
designed to limit a particular type of speech, specifically speech that
advocated the overthrow of the Government.0 2 On its most simple
terms, the statute at issue in Speiser was aimed at the content of
the speech. It was in no way content neutral, and it was aimed at
the suppression of "dangerous ideas."0 3 In the section 527 context,
the Government is not attempting to regulate the content of the
speech of the exempt entity. Instead, it is trying to ensure that only
well-regulated political organizations receive tax benefits. When
Congress originally passed the provision providing for tax-exempt
status for political organizations, Congress did so because it believed
that political organizations were essential to the political process
30 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514-15 (1958).
2 Id. at 514-17.
Id. at 519. Compare Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(determining that University of Virginia's decision not to fund student organizations that
engage in religious speech was viewpoint discrimination that violated First Amendment),
with Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (denying that subsidy
for lobbying is aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas). Rosenberger distinguished Regan
based on the fact that denying a tax benefit for lobbying is not viewpoint discrimination.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. See generally Jeffrey VanHooreweghe, Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez. The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity to Clarify the Viewpoint
Discrimination Doctrine's Role in Subsidized Speech Cases, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 539 (2001)




and deserved a tax exemption.0 4 Congress was not required to
provide the tax exemption to political organizations. Just as
Congress had the authority to provide a benefit to political organiza-
tions, it also has the authority to determine that it will provide that
benefit only when those organizations are regulated, make public
disclosures, and are accountable to the citizenry. 5 There is no
evidence that one particular party or organization receives a
disproportionate benefit under section 527. Elimination or regula-
tion of exempt entities therefore may have been aimed at undis-
closed, politically motivated speech but it was not aimed at a
particular idea.
This distinction undoubtedly will be unsatisfactory to some since
the First Amendment covers not only content-based regulation, but
also governs the prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.
306
It could be argued that the changes in section 527 are intended to
limit public discussion during political campaigns. But the Court
seems to be moving away from such a strict interpretation of
viewpoint/topic regulation.0 7 Unlike the newspaper cases cited
above,308 section 527 does not penalize speech on a particular topic
and is not designed to suppress particular ideas. Any exempt
political organization engaging in speech to influence an election
must disclose its contributors and expenditures, or pay tax on the
undisclosed amounts.0 9 There is no attempt to penalize entities
based on either the viewpoint of the organization or the topic it
seeks to discuss. The organization simply loses the benefit of its
exempt status on contributions and expenditures it chooses not to
disclose.1l
So 5. REP. No. 93.1357, at 25-27 (1974), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7502.
3O Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 312-16 (1913).
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984).
See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) ("[D]ifferential taxation of speakers,
even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed
at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas."); Regan, 461 U.S. at 548
(differential tax treatment of lobbying by charities and veterans' groups was constitutional
since there was no showing that statute was intended to suppress dangerous ideas).
See supra note 274 (citing newspaper cases).
I.R.C. § 527(b), (c), (j) (2000).
310 I.R.C. § 527(j).
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Similarly, general tax statutes that impact the delivery of speech
do not violate the First Amendment as long as they are not designed
to suppress specific ideas or content. In Leathers v. Medlock u the
Court considered, once again, the conflict between taxation statutes
and the First Amendment. Medlock involved a slightly different
legal question than the one at issue in Cammarano, Regan, and
ASAE. In Medlock, the question was whether the denial of an
exemption to cable operators from an Arkansas sales tax violated
the First Amendment. 12 The cable companies argued that their
expressive activities were protected by the First Amendment and
that Arkansas's sales taxation of cable services violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments because newspapers, magazines, and
satellite broadcast services are exempt from sales taxation.31
While recognizing that cable broadcasts were speech under the
First Amendment, the Court noted that a tax that discriminates
among speakers is constitutionally suspect only in certain circum-
stances.1 4 Specifically, the Court noted that in several cases it
found taxes specifically directed at the press to be in violation of the
First Amendment, 15 but that this particular tax neither singled out
the press for special treatment nor applied exclusively to the
press. 3 16  The Court stressed that differential taxation of First
Amendment speakers is suspect when it attempts to suppress the
"expression of particular ideas or viewpoints" or the "content of
taxpayer speech.317 The Court concluded that "differential taxation
of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First
Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of
suppressing, particular ideas." 18
3" 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
312 Id. at 441-42.
3" Id. at 442-43.
" Id. at 444.
3,3 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93
(1983) (holding that tax on cost of paper and ink over $100,000 consumed in production of
publications violated First Amendment); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51
(1936) (finding tax on publications with weekly circulations above 20,000 unconstitutional).
316 Medlock, 499 U.S. at 444-47.
317 Id. at 447.
31; Id. at 453.
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The lesson from Cammarano, Regan, Medlock, and Speiser is that
the conferral of tax-exempt status is not a right, but a privilege that
the Government may condition upon meeting certain requirements.
This ability to condition a benefit is not absolute, but as long as the
Government does not attempt to suppress "dangerous ideas" and an
individual or entity still has an ability to "speak" in some forum, the
taxation scheme will survive First Amendment scrutiny.
Under this line of reasoning, the Government could condition an
organization's tax-exempt status on the organization's acceptance of
a regulatory scheme requiring disclosure of contributors and
expenditures. Any provision relying on the tax benefit doctrine to
regulate exempt entities should have the following attributes:
1) A concrete tax benefit must be available to organiza-
tions that file, and are granted, section 527 status
and agree to be bound by the disclosure provisions in
section 527;
2) The denial of the subsidy at issue must be narrowly
tailored to the benefit received or the provisions must
provide a clear opt-out option for entities that choose
not to accept the subsidy; and
3) The statute must not attempt to regulate the specific
content of the speech. 19
Since Congress could draft a statute that meets the above require-
ments, Congress has the power to use the subsidy rationale in
Regan to regulate political organizations.320
a" Although some may question whether the tax benefit may be denied solely based on
the content of the speech, it appears from Rust that as long as an unsubsidized forum is
available, the Government can condition a benefit based on content. Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991). In LSC, the Court implies that Rust can be distinguished because
in that case the speaker was acting on behalf of the Government. Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-49 (2001). For an alternative explanation, see Post, supra note
278, at 174-75, which argues that the decision in Rust can be seen as regulation of speech
within managerial domains. However, Post rejects the regulation as lacking justification
even under the lower standard he argues applies to speech within managerial domains. Post,
supra note 278, at 174-75.
m See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing Regan subsidy rationale).
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F. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION'S EXEMPT STATUS MAY BE CONDITIONED
ON AN ENTITY'S WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH A REGULATORY
SCHEME
Since section 527 political organizations do in fact receive a tax
subsidy based on their exempt status, the disclosure provisions in
section 527 should be upheld under the subsidy rationale in Regan
as long as the statutory framework operates constitutionally to
condition the subsidy based on an entity's willingness to comply
with regulatory requirements.
1. Current 527 Framework. The disclosure provisions contained
in section 527 are designed to comply with the subsidy rationale in
Regan. It is unclear, however, whether section 527 as amended
provides a sufficient opt-out procedure, if it provides one at all, to
survive constitutional challenge. 32 1 According to the Government,
under section 527(i),3 2 an organization is not treated as a political
organization unless it files a notice with the Secretary of
Treasury. 23 This notice provision creates two types of organiza-
tions, those that notify the Secretary (opt-in) and those that do not
(opt-out). An organization that opts out presumably is not a
political organization and is not subject to the disclosure provisions;
instead its contributions and expenditures are subject to tax under
subsection (i)(4) .24
"21 In NFRA, the district court concluded that there was a sufficient opt-out procedure for
the contribution disclosure provisions to be upheld under the Regan analysis. Nat'l Fed'n of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1319-20 (2002). The court
took a very different approach with regard to the expenditure disclosure provisions. Id. at
1320. The court recognized that under subsection 0), an exempt organization that failed to
disclose its contributions and expenditures could incur a penalty (or a tax) greater than its
income. Id. Specifically, an organization that failed to disclose both its contributions and
expenditures would be subject to a penalty of 57%. The court believed that subsection (j) as
it applied to expenditures went beyond merely withdrawing a tax subsidy, since the amount
the exempt organization was required to pay exceeded the amount of the subsidy. Id. at 1320-
21. The court therefore concluded that the First Amendment analysis in Buckley v. Valeo,
and not the subsidy analysis in Regan v. Taxpayers With Representation, applied. Id. at 1322.
2 I.R.C. § 527(i) (2000).
' Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-6, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No.
00-0759-RV-C).
4 I.R.C. § 527(i)(4) (2000). Under subsection (i)(4), if an organization fails to notify the
Secretary that it is a political organization, the taxable income of such an organization
includes its exempt function income as well as any deductions directly associated with the
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If an organization opts in, it has a further choice of disclosing all
contributions and expenditures or only disclosing specific ones.2 5
Those that choose to disclose all contributions and expenditures are
not taxed on their exempt function income (i.e., the contributions
and expenditures are not included in income). 26 Those that choose
to opt-in but not to disclose all contributions or expenditures are
subject to tax, also referred to as a penalty, on those contributions
and expenditures that the political organization chooses not to
disclose.327
The Government's reading of the statute generally fits within the
subsidy rationale in Regan. Under the Government's interpretation,
entities have two different ways by which they can opt-out of the
regulatory scheme, and the consequence of doing so is merely the
denial of a tax exemption, either in whole or in part. 2 ' Its interpre-
tation that political organizations have a choice whether to comply
with the disclosure provisions is weakened by the fact that subsec-
tion (j)(1) is described as a "penalty for failure" to comply and does
not, on its face, appear to be merely an opt-out provision. 29
production of such income. Id. In addition, payments to such an organization presumably
would not be exempt from gift tax under § 2501(a)(5) because such an organization would not
be a political organization within the meaning of§ 527(e)(1). See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (stating
that gift tax does not apply to transfer of money to political organization). But see Simmons,
supra note 71, at 98 (arguing that these payments may not be gifts, but instead are purchases
of services with value equal to contributions).
' Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No.
00-0759-RV-C).
326 Id.
" The Code provides that if an organization fails to make a disclosure required by
subsection (j)(1), the organization shall pay an amount equal to the highest corporate tax rate
multiplied by the amount to which the failure relates. I.R.C. § 527(j)(1). The highest
corporate rate is currently 35%. I.R.C. § 11(b).
2 Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No.
00-0759-RV-C).
m I.R.C. § 527(j)(1). Regardless of the section heading, subsection ()(1) operates in a
similar manner as the "proxy tax" discussed above in American Society of Association
Executives v. United States, see supra notes 251-60 and accompanying text, and operates as
a mechanism for allowing exempt organizations to receive contributions even though those
contributions are not disclosed. Moreover, even if subsection (j) is a penalty provision, the
penalty applies only to organizations that opt into the regulatory scheme in § 527. The
organization still has an opt-out option since it can decline to file with the Secretary and pay
a tax based on subsection (i)(4).
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The language in subsection (j)(1)(A) also implies that the
disclosures are required and not merely a choice.3 ' If these
disclosures are required, then opt-in organizations may be subject
to criminal penalties for failure to provide information required by
the Internal Revenue laws.33" '
The Government's argument is also somewhat weakened by the
fact that opt-in organizations must pay tax on both undisclosed
contributions and expenditures.3 2 On first blush, the taxation of
expenditures appears contrary to merely requiring contributions to
be included in income and appears to be more of a penalty than the
denial of a subsidy. Although taxing both contributions and
expenditures can create a very high tax rate,"3 it is very unlikely
that an organization would be subject to tax on both its contribu-
tions and expenditures.
In the first instance, organizations that choose under subsection
(i) not to identify themselves as political organizations are taxed on
their exempt function income. 34 Exempt function income includes
m See I.R.C. § 527(j)(1)(A); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States,
148 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (finding that requirements in § 527(j) are not
optional). Except for organizations exempted by the statute, all political organizations are
required to file the notice with the Secretary. Rev. Rul. 2000-49, 2000-2 C.B. 430 (Oct. 12,
2000). But recent statements by the IRS indicate that the disclosure provisions are optional.
See I.R.S. Notice 2002-34, 2002-21 I.R.B. 990 ('To be tax-exempt, a political organization...
must file Form 8871."); I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS 2002-11 (May 2002) ("The filing requirements...
apply to those political organizations that ... wish to be exempt from federal income tax
provisions.").
331 If an organization is required to make a disclosure and fails to do so, the Government
may seek criminal penalties under § 7203. See I.R.C. § 7203 (noting that willful failure to file
return, supply information, or pay tax may result in criminal penalties); see also Nat'l Fed'n
of Republican Assemblies, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (finding that subsection (j) operates as
penalty, not tax). The district court in NFRA recognized, however, that the Government
claimed that "section 7203 does not apply to Section 5270) [and that] Section 527(j) effectively
establishes that it will not be used to sanction nondisclosing political organizations." Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1322 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
3 I.R.C. § 527(j) (2000).
Plaintiffs in NFRA contend that this creates a 70% tax (i.e., 35% on contributions and
35% on expenditures). Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (No.
00-0759-RV-C). The statute actually creates an effective tax rate of 57.75%. For example, if
an organization fails to disclose both contributions and expenditures, the first $100 it receives
will be taxed at 35% causing the organization to pay a tax of $35. Once the remaining $65
is spent, the organization must once again pay tax on that amount, causing a tax of $22.75.
The total tax on the $100 will be $57.75, not $70.
3' I.R.C. § 527(i)(4) (2000).
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
contributions to the organization but it does not include expendi-
tures.335 Thus, an organization that wishes to be completely
anonymous can do so, and it will not be subject to tax on its
expenditures. Under subsection (i)(4) it will only be taxed on its
income.33 ' This provides a mechanism by which an organization can
avoid disclosure and simply lose the benefit of its exempt status. 7
If an organization chooses to disclose some contributions and
expenditures but not others, the organization is subject to tax
treatment under subsection (). 8 It is subsection (j) that provides
a tax at the highest corporate rate for any undisclosed contributions
or expenditures. 3 9 But this provision applies in the context of an
organization that is seeking the benefit of exempt status but chooses
not to disclose specific contributions or expenditures. If expendi-
tures were not subject to tax, an organization could use this partial
disclosure method to obfuscate the provision's purpose.
If expenditures were not subject to tax, an organization could file
with the Secretary as a section 527 political organization. It could
then disclose all of its contributions under subsection (j), but none
of its expenditures. Absent section 527(j)(1), the organization would
succeed in being exempt from tax because its contributions were
disclosed and would not be subject to tax. The organization could
remain anonymous because its expenditures were not disclosed, and
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine what political
advocacy the organization funded. The tax on expenditures ensures
that if an organization chooses to comply with section 527, it cannot
avoid the disclosure provisions by disclosing all contributions and no
expenditures. 4 °
835 I.R.C. § 527(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 527(i)(4).
The district court in NFRA rejected this logic, stating, "Even indulging the generous
assumption that political organizations will routinely and repeatedly weigh the risk of a
penalty exceeding their tax exemption if they do give notice against the risk of unnecessarily
forfeiting a tax exemption if they do not, mistakes will certainly be made in these predic-
tions." NFRA, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. The fact that some exempt organizations will not
choose correctly does not vitiate the fact that they had a choice.
I.R.C. § 527(j)(1) (2000).
Id.
o To the extent that the expenditures are from funds that were tax exempt (i.e., the
organization disclosed some contributions, but did not disclose its expenditures), taxing
expenditures might be justified on the same grounds as denying an ordinary and necessary
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Finally, under the alternative theory that views section 527(i) as
the opt-out provision and subsection (j) as an enforcement provision
of subsection (i), many of the concerns discussed above do not apply.
Although the Government has argued that subsection (j) provides
exempt organizations with a choice whether to disclose or not,3 41 it
also can be seen as an enforcement mechanism applicable to
organizations that choose to opt into the regulatory structure. The
statute as written provides that an organization may opt into the
statutory framework by filing with the Secretary, or it may opt-out
and pay tax on its income.342 If it opts in, it is then subject to the
disclosure requirements. Under this theory, subsection (j) is not an
attempt to provide more options, but instead can be seen as a
provision to enforce the original decision to opt-in or not. Once an
organization chooses the benefit of tax-exempt status, it must
disclose. Subsection (j) merely enforces disclosure and requires that
organizations that fail to disclose must pay the amount established
in subsection (). 43 If this analysis is correct, section 527 meets the
subsidy rationale because the subsidy is being conditioned upon an
organization's willingness to comply with the regulatory structure.
Organizations that are not willing to comply must pay a tax under
subsection (i)(4). Organizations that are willing to do so are exempt.
business deduction for political expenses. Expenditures of the exempt organization are
similar to the ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred by other corporations, and
other corporations are not allowed to deduct these payments. If expenditures are derived
from income that was not subject to tax, absent taxing expenditures, the exempt organization
could pay for its political work with tax-exempt undisclosed funds. This is exactly what the
disallowance of the deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses prohibits other
businesses from doing. The taxation of expenditures can therefore be seen as necessary to
obtain symmetry with the Code provisions that prohibit deductions as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. If businesses cannot obtain deductions for these expenditures, exempt
organizations should not get the same benefit when they fail to disclose the expenditures.
"' Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No.
00-0759.RV-C).
"2 I.R.C. § 527(i) (2000). An organization that wishes to opt-out is not required to notify
the IRS of that choice. Id. All organizations that file to opt-in are subject to tax. Id.
"' If Congress did not require some type of penalty on undisclosed expenditures under
subsection (j), § 527 organizations could obfuscate the purposes of the Act by disclosing all
contributions and no expenditures. It often is unhelpful to know who funds an organization
if one does not know who the organization supports. This problem is partially rectified by
FCC rules that require political television advertisements to carry the name of the sponsor
of the advertisement. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2001).
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Subsection (j) merely deals with organizations that agree to comply
with the statute, but then do not do so. In that instance, the penalty
may exceed the amount of the subsidy. If it did not, all organiza-
tions would choose to be exempt under subsection (i)(4) and then not
disclose under subsection (j).
2. Where There Is a Will There Is a Way. In its attempt to avoid
the First Amendment problems associated with Buckley and require
disclosure of what it saw as abusive attempts to obfuscate campaign
finance regulations, Congress created a new, complex campaign
regulatory scheme within the tax code. Sponsors of the amendment
believed that by placing these provisions in the Code, they could
avoid constitutional problems. 44 In doing so, they created other
problems. They rested the validity of the statute on the subsidy
rationale in Regan, but failed to clearly justify the existence of a
subsidy. They neither established that entities involved were
originally properly subject to tax, nor that the statute really
operated as a decision to withhold a subsidy. Opponents of the
provision have, therefore, been able to argue that the provision does
not fit within the Regan subsidy framework.
45
But the overarching question is not whether this particular
statute does what it is supposed to do, but whether a statute could
be written to achieve the reformers' goals.3 48 Although I believe
section 527, if properly interpreted, could withstand constitutional
attacks, Congress could design a statute that more clearly achieves
the reformers' objectives. In considering a new taxation scheme,
Congress should clarify (1) the tax benefits received by tax-exempt
political organizations, (2) that an option exists to opt-out of the
taxation scheme, and (3) that criminal penalties do not apply.
'4 146 CONG. REC. S5996 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman); 146
CONG. REC. S6000 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (statement of Sen. Feingold); 146 CONG. REC.
S996 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain); 146 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed.
June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Haughton).
Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300,1312-15 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
For a discussion of conditional federal spending and federal powers, see Albert J.
Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1123-
27 (1987).
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To reach this goal, Congress should take the following steps:
1) The Code should be amended to clarify that gross
income under section 61 includes payments received
by an organization in furtherance of the organiza-
tion's causes.347 Section 102 also could be amended to
clarify that these payments are not gifts. Amending
sections 61 and 102 will clarify the tax baseline and
eliminate any question whether the exempt status of
the political organization provides a subsidy to the
organization. 48
2) Congress should create a second type of political
entity deemed a political corporation. This entity
would be taxable as a corporation, but would be
prohibited from having shareholders or paying
dividends. It would be a hybrid between the exempt
political organization and a classic subchapter C
corporation.349 The entity would be the organiza-
tional form for all organizations involved in political
advocacy, broadly defined, that choose either not to
file as a section 527 organization or do not come
within the definition of a political organization under
section 527. These organizations would be taxed on
payments to the organization as income and would
not be able to deduct payments on political advertise-
7 This provision would not apply to exempt organizations because they are exempt from
tax under § 501 of the Code. I.R.C. § 501 (2000).
' The payments still might not be classified as income if they were determined to be
capital contributions, but this language at least creates a baseline that contributions to a
political organization are income. Congress made a similar determination with regard to gifts
from employers. I.R.C. § 102(c). Instead of applying a factual analysis to determine whether
gifts from an employer are made with detached and disinterested generosity, Congress
statutorily determined that all transfers from an employer to an employee, except certain de
minimis ones, constitute income to the employee. Id.
"' Subchapter C corporations are those corporations organized under subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 301-386. These provisions govern the rules of taxation
for most corporations. S corporations, governed by subchapter S of the Code, are small
business corporations that meet, among other things, specific organizational requirements
regarding the number of shareholders and classes of stock. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1377. Section
1361(a)(2) of the Code defines a subchapter C corporation as a corporation which is not an S
corporation. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2).
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ments unless those expenditures would otherwise be
deductible under section 162. This entity would
provide a clear "opt-out" choice for political organiza-
tions seeking to refrain from making the necessary
disclosures under section 527.
3) To clarify that an opt-out option exists and that
criminal penalties do not apply to organizations
exercising the opt-out option, section 527 should be
amended to clarify that an organization's filing as a
section 527 exempt organization is optional. If the
entity prefers to avoid disclosure completely, it may
file as a political corporation. Subsection (i) could be
amended to clarify that an entity that meets the
definition of a political organization, but chooses not
to file with the Secretary, will be deemed a political
corporation. 5 ' Obviously, if the political corporation
engages in advocacy covered by FECA, it would be
subject to FECA's disclosure requirements despite its
decision to opt-out of section 527's disclosure provi-
sions.
4) Section 527(j) should be reworked to clarify that if an
organization "opts out" either wholly or in part, it
does not suffer a penalty and is not subject to crimi-
nal penalty. Congress could modify subsection (j) to
recognize the three types of organizations the Govern-
ment claims can exist under section 527. The first
type of entity, an organization that chooses not to
disclose, will no longer be subject to section 527, but
instead will be subject to the provisions underlying
the new political corporation. The two remaining
entities---organizations that file with the Secretary as
political organizations and choose to disclose their
contributions and expenditures, and those organiza-
While headings are not part of the statute, the heading for subsection (i) states that
"[o]rganizations must notify Secretary that they are section 527 organizations." I.R.C. §
527(i). This heading can be read as requiring organizations that seek exempt status to notify
the Secretary, but for clarification reasons, Congress may also wish to modify the heading for
subsection (i).
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tions that seek to avoid disclosure with respect to
specific contributions and expenditures-will be
subject to tax on the undisclosed amounts. Subsec-
tion (i) should therefore be further clarified to indi-
cate that organizations may withhold disclosure on
some contributions or expenditures without suffering
a penalty. In this regard, subsection (i) should
provide a method by which a political organization
may file with the Secretary the amounts of contribu-
tions or expenditures that it chooses not to disclose,
and the organization may pay a tax at the highest
corporate rate for those amounts.351
5) Since section 2501 currently exempts payments to
political organizations from the gift tax,852 section
2501 needs to be modified to clarify that this excep-
tion does not apply to undisclosed payments to a
political organization.
6) Because the potential for criminal penalties may be
seen as a significant infringement on free speech and
could potentially shift the statutory scheme from a
subsidy scheme to a penalty scheme, section 527
should include language that clarifies that the failure
to make a disclosure under section 527 will not result
in criminal liability.
These changes would clarify that Congress was seeking to deny
a tax benefit to political organizations that choose not to disclose
political contributions. While there is still a subsidy/penalty
problem-the lack of a subsidy may operate as a penalty-the
statutory scheme I recommend fits within the current subsidy
" As previously discussed in the context of the "proxy tax," taxing the contributions at
the highest corporate rate makes sense because that is the rate at which the organization
would likely have to pay tax on the payments had it not been exempt from tax. See supra
notes 256-60 and accompanying text. Since the exempt organization is opting out only with
respect to specific payments, it is difficult to determine what the exempt organization's tax
rate would have been. Using the highest corporate rate ensures that the exempt organization
will not get a tax benefit in the form of a rate reduction by choosing the opt-out option instead
of the political corporation option.
112 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (2000).
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framework in Regan. It clarifies that the exempt status of political
organizations provides them with significant tax benefits and
provides them with two methods of opting out. A political entity
may organize as a political corporation and pay tax on its contribu-
tions, or it may organize as a political organization and pay tax on
those contributions the organization seeks not to disclose. Finally,
these changes clarify that criminal penalties do not exist for the
failure of an organization to meet the disclosure requirements.3 53
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF
CONTRIBUTORS AND EXPENDITURES
Although a thorough discussion of Buckley and its impact on
campaign finance disclosure provisions is outside the scope of this
Article, one approach that may have allowed reformers to avoid the
tax subsidy approach used in section 527 is worth discussing, even
if in abbreviated form.854 In Buckley, the Court upheld disclosure
provisions, without limiting the definition of contributions or
" Congress could further increase the likelihood that the statute will be upheld by
raising the minimum dollar amount of a contribution and expenditure that must be disclosed.
Clearly, contributions of $200 and expenditures of $500 do not cause the type of concern
regarding political corruption that is normally presented in the campaign context; amounts
of $1,000 and $5,000 seem far more reasonable.
'" For a more thorough discussion of Buckley, see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:
A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045,
1053-55 (1985) (arguing Buckley was properly decided); Hasen, supra note 97, at 276-83
(arguing that Congress has power to require disclosure of contributions and expenditures
with regard to issue advertising); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1057-84 (1996) (arguing
against reform and contending that corruption rationale is faulty and that campaign finance
reform offends notions of equality). See generally BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE
JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (E. Joshua Rosenkrantz ed., 1998)
(arguing that campaign finance regulation is not counter to First Amendment); IF BUCKLEY
FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS (E. Joshua
Rosenkrantz ed., 1999) (reporting on Twentieth Century Fund Working Group on Campaign
Finance Litigation's belief that Supreme Court should overrule or limit parts of Buckley); THE
CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Frederick G. Slabach ed., 1998) (providing
anthology of articles on campaign finance reform); Richard Kornylak, Note, Disclosing the
Election-Related Activities of Interest Groups Through § 527 of the Tax Code, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 230 (2002) (calling for objective criteria to determine if advertisement is election
related); David D. Storey, Note, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth PACs
and Providing a Model for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167 (2002) (arguing
that section 527 is less than comprehensive campaign finance reform).
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expenditures to express advocacy, to the extent that the contribu-
tions and expenditures were paid to, or expended by, a political
committee. 5 5 In the political committee context, it is the entity, not
whether the entity engages in express or issue advocacy, that
subjects the organization to campaign finance disclosure. To the
extent political organizations are similar to political committees,
Congress did not need to amend the Code to subject section 527
organizations to the disclosure provisions in FECA. Under Buckley,
Congress can mandate that political organizations comply with the
disclosure provisions in FECA and disclose contributors and
expenditures.356
A. BUCKLEY V. VALEO: THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE CONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
In the context of campaign finance reform, reformers advocate
the disclosure of contributors to and expenditures of entities
involved in influencing elections. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court set
out the traditional structure for analyzing Congress's ability to
require the disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures.357 The Buckley line of cases indicates when individuals and
organizations must comply with the disclosure provisions in
FECA.358 These cases have established the traditional "issue
advocacy" v. "express advocacy" distinction.5 9 Express advocacy is
often defined as communication containing express words of
advocacy such as "vote for," "elect," and "vote against.""36 Under this
' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67-70 (1976). For a definition of political committee, see
infra notes 388-407 and accompanying text.
aw Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-70.
Id. at 60-85.
's Missouri v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 414-15 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that"so called" issue advertising is not subject to FECA); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (finding that MCFL was
not political committee and its advertisements, which were not express advocacy, were not
subject to FECA). See also supra note 70 (interpreting Buckley with regard to express/issue
advertising).
'9 See supra note 70 (addressing issue).
o Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (providing examples of wordg of advocacy that include
"'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
'reject' "). These words of advocacy are sometimes referred to as magic words. As discussed
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approach, only express advocacy is regulated under FECA and
subject to disclosure requirements.
1. Buckley v. Valeo: Treatment of Expenditures and Contribu-
tions. In 1974, as part of a major post-Watergate campaign reform
effort, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments. 6 ' The Act was designed to reduce the corrupting influence
of money in the political process and contained significant restric-
tions on political contributions and expenditures on almost every
entity involved in the political process. 6 ' As is relevant for this
discussion, the Act restricted the amount that individuals and
groups could contribute to and spend relative to a clearly identified
candidate, and it required disclosure of contributions or expendi-
tures by almost anyone engaged in speech designed to influence an
el6ction.36 3
In discussing provisions in FECA regarding contribution and
expenditure limitations, the Court differentiated between expendi-
tures, which it believed were entitled to significant protection, and
contributions, which it believed were entitled to less protection. 64
The Court upheld contribution limitations with regard to contribu-
tions to a clearly identified candidate or political committee.3 65 The
Court found that such a restriction had only a marginal restriction
upon the contributors' ability to engage in free communication.3 6
The Court also believed that the contribution limitation was
justified by the Government's interest of preventing corruption in
the campaign context.367
supra in note 70, what constitutes express advocacy is still an open question.
"' Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000)).
362 Id. See also 120 Cong. Rec. 8183-8185 (1974) (statement of Sen. Pell, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections). For a discussion of political contributions and
their influence on elections, see generally ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: FINANCING
ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (2000).
' Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000)).
86 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 21; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-87 (2000)
(determining that limiting contributions left communication significantly unimpaired).
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 ('To the extent that large contributions are given to secure
a political quidpro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system
of representative democracy is undermined."); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
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The Court took a different approach with regard to expenditure
limitations."' 8 The Court noted that this provision would subject an
individual to a criminal penalty for placing a one-quarter page
advertisement "relative to" a candidate in a major metropolitan
newspaper.6 9 The Court was particularly concerned that the Act
contained criminal penalties, and that the vague language in the Act
could provide a "trap for the innocent" by not providing fair warning
that an advertiser might be subject to the Act's requirements. 7 °
The Court found that the phrase "relative to" was indefinite because
it "fail[ed] to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and
impermissible speech." '71 In order to resolve the risk posed by the
statute's ambiguity, the Court limited section 608(e) to communica-
tions that "in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate for Federal office."3 ' Even so limited,
the Court found that the Government interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption was inadequate to
justify the restrictions on independent expenditures."7 3
The Court took another approach with regard to the disclosure
provisions that apply to political candidates and political commit-
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1984) ('Corruption is a subversion
of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of
office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their
campaigns."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)
(preventing corruption or appearance of corruption implicates integrity of democratic process);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (determining that
government interest in preventing corruption has never been doubted).
's Section 101(a) of FECA amends 18 U.S.C. § 608 and provides that "no person" may
make expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" that exceed an aggregate
amount of $1,000 in any year. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 608
(2000)).
W9 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40.
3'0 Id. at 41 & n.48.
'"' Id. at 41-42.
3W2 Id. at 44.
' Id. But see Buchsbaum, supra note 17, at 675 (noting that because of size and way in
which independent expenditures are made candidates may feel indebted to entity making
contribution, and listing examples when such influence may have been wielded); David
Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate Contributions
and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 86-88 (1998) (arguing that Court should
revisit underpinnings of its decision in light of changes in political landscape). See generally
David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1369 (1994) (discussing corruption rationale in context of equality and direct democracy).
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tees. Section 434 of FECA requires political candidates and
committees to disclose their contributions and expenditures in any
calendar year. 74 Contributions and expenditures are defined as
amounts "for the purpose of ... influencing" the nomination or
election of a candidate for federal office. 375 Although the Court
recognized that compelled disclosure can seriously infringe upon the
First Amendment, it found the Government's interests outweighed
that infringement.376 Specifically, the Court recognized that (1)
disclosure provides the public with information that may be helpful
to voters in evaluating those who seek office, and that sources of a
candidate's financial support also alert voters to the interests to
which candidates are most likely to be responsive; (2) disclosure
requirements deter actual corruption and the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to
publicity; and (3) disclosure provides an essential means for
gathering information necessary to police violations of expenditure
and contribution limits.3 77
2. Disclosure Provisions for Independent Expenditures over $100.
Section 434(e) of FECA required that "[e]very person.., who makes
contributions or expenditures" over $100 in a calendar year other
than to a political committee or candidate for the purpose of
influencing elections must file a statement with the FEC.3 78
Individuals who failed to make such a disclosure were subject to
civil and criminal penalties. 37 ' The Court determined that the
provision was vague and overbroad because it could be interpreted
to include individuals or organizations who were merely engaged in
3" Section 434(b)(3)(A) of FECA requires a political committee to disclose all contributions
in excess of $200. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2000). Section 434(b)(4) of FECA requires the
disclosure of expenses. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(4).
876 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i).
378 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-66.
377 Id. at 67-68. The Court noted, however, that minor parties must be allowed to show
that they will suffer impermissibly by disclosure. Id. at 73-74; see also Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (holding that disclosure did not
apply to minor political party that had historically been object of harassment); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466-67 (1958) (holding that NAACP did not need to disclose
membership lists).
78 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (2000).
'79 2 U.S.C. § 437(g)(6)(A), (g)(11).
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issue discussion."ze Section 434(e) applied to everyone and covered
an extremely broad range of issue-related speech, and it is no
wonder the Supreme Court found that this provision raised serious
constitutional concerns.
In order to avoid the vagueness problem, the Court construed
section 434(e) as imposing reporting requirements only on individu-
als and groups when they make contributions earmarked for a
candidate or political committee, or when they make expenditures
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for
public office.381 In such instances, there would be no trap for the
innocent and no chance that issue discussion would be hampered.
The Court made clear that this express advocacy limitation did not
apply to political candidates or committees.8 2
Since the Court construed section 434(e) as applying only to
express advocacy, political organizations have argued that their
issue advocacy speech cannot be subject to disclosure require-
ments.8 ' Although the Court limited section 434(e) to express
advocacy, there is nothing in Buckley that indicates that speech
other than express advocacy can never be subject to disclosure
requirements.1 4
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-77.
38' Id. at 79-80.
382 Id. at 80.
' Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 25-26,
Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001)
(No. 00-0759-RV-C).
' See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1845, 1873 (1999) (arguing that, despite decision in Buckley, several kinds of disclosure
provisions may still be constitutional); Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure
and the First Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71, 71 (1999) (stating that Court did not address
disclosure requirements in communication not expressly advocating election or defeat of
candidate, but that without facts that disclosure poses severe restriction on litigant and scales
tip toward disclosure); Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, The Frequently Mischaracterized
Impact of the Courts on the FEC and Campaign Finance Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 848-49
(2002) (demonstrating courts' varying interpretations of Buckley express advocacy, some of
which recognized speech outside explicit terms provided in Buckley as subject to disclosure
requirements). But see Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue Advocacy, "and
Buckley v. Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285, 289-90 (2000)
(arguing that Court in Buckley narrowed construction of disclosure requirements to apply
only to express advocacy). The district court recognized this point in NFRA and concluded
that political advocacy can be regulated even if it is not express advocacy. Nat'l Fed'n of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1323-25 (S.D. Ala. 2002). It
also concluded that the absence of express advocacy is not necessarily issue advocacy. Id.
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B. REFORMERS MAY NOT HAVE HAD TO USE THE TAX CODE AS A
MECHANISM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE SINCE POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS MAY BE REGULATED UNDER BUCKLEY
Under the traditional Buckley approach, communication becomes
subject to FECA's disclosure requirements based on the content of
the speech, regardless whether it is express or issue advocacy. An
alternative "entity" approach, which requires disclosure not based
on the content of the speech, but on the entity engaged in the
speech, is also constitutional under FECA. Under the entity
approach, there are at least two possible justifications for upholding
the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions in section 527 even
under Buckley. First, political organizations are similar to political
committees, and they arguably fall within the statutory definition
of political committees. 5 Secondly, even if political organizations
are not political committees and cannot be treated as such, the
reasons for upholding disclosure requirements for political commit-
tees also apply to political organizations. Since political organiza-
tions are expressly chartered to influence elections, the vagueness
concerns outlined in Buckley simply do not apply. 6 In the section
527 context, there are no traps for the innocent, and there is no fear
that individuals or groups will be criminally prosecuted based on
ambiguous language."'
1. Political Organizations Fit Within the Definition of Political
Committee. FECA defines political committees as "any committee,
club, association, or other group of persons which receives contribu-
tions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or
See Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 60 (2000)
(testimony of Glenn J. Moramarco) (arguing that § 527 organizations are political
committees).
' See Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 25,
Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001)
(No. 00-0759-RV-C); Kornylak, supra note 354, at 254 (arguing that spending by § 527
organizations is by definition campaign related and that concerns regarding vagueness in
Buckley are not present in NFRA).
" See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 663 (1997) (arguing that contribution limits should be replaced with vigorous
disclosure requirements, and contending that arguments against disclosure requirements are
weaker in context of candidate elections).
688 [Vol. 37:611
2003] ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND SECTION 527
makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a
calendar year."3 Contributions and expenditures are defined as
anything of value for the purpose of influencing the nomination or
election of a candidate for federal office. 8 ' Under this definition,
political organizations would generally fall under the definition of
political committee since, by definition, they are formed to influence
the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of an individual
to federal office.3 "'
The Court further limited the definition of political committee in
its discussion regarding the expenditure disclosure provisions. 91
The Court found that the definition of political committee might
reach groups engaged in purely issue discussion, and it limited the
definition of political committee to "encompass organizations that
are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which
is the nomination or election of a candidate.
' 392
The Court, however, did not limit the definition of political
committee as it applied to the disclosure of contributions.393 In fact,
prior to Buckley, the Court in Burroughs v. United States 94 upheld
disclosure provisions with regard to political committees, which
were defined as organizations that receive contributions or make
expenditures "for the purpose of influencing or attempting to
influence" the presidential and vice presidential elections.3 5 The
Court held that Congress had the authority to pass legislation that
safeguarded elections "from the improper use of money to influence
the result. '39
' Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000).
39 Id. § 431(8)(a).
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2000) (defining exempt function). This provision would not apply to
§ 527 organizations that are formed to influence state or local elections. The district court in
NFRA held the disclosure provisions violated the Tenth Amendment in that Congress,
through § 527, sought to regulate state and local election campaigns. Nat'l Fed'n of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1352-53 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
Id. (emphasis added).
See Hasen, supra note 97, at 270 (discussing Buckley and contribution disclosure
provisions).
" 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
m Id. at 541. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (Title III of the Act of Feb. 28, 1925),
43 Stat. 1070, cited in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61 (1976).
' Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
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But even if the more limited definition of political committee used
in the expenditure context applies in the contribution context, many
section 527 organizations still fit the definition of a political
committee. Section 527 organizations are, by definition, created to
influence the election of an individual to federal office.897 If that is
the purpose of the organization, then it clearly satisfies the
requirement that its major purpose be the nomination of a federal
candidate. 98
It is unclear, however, whether political organizations could be
subject to the full panoply of regulations that apply to political
committees. In dicta in Federal Election Commission v. Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life ("MCFL"),899 the Court indicated that subject-
ing a political organization like MCFL400 to the full range of
regulatory requirements that apply to political committees would
likely be so burdensome as to foreclose speech.4"' But the Court
specifically noted that, if MCFL's independent spending became so
significant that its major purpose was to influence elections, then
the organization would be properly classified as a political commit-
tee.
402
Thus, while it is unclear whether section 527 organizations can
be subject to all of the restrictions that apply to political committees,
it is clear that political organizations fit the general definition of
political committee. The justifications for upholding disclosure
This would not apply to § 527 organizations engaged in purely state or local campaigns.
Once again, it is clear that this discussion does not apply to § 527 organizations
organized to influence state and local elections. State and local disclosure provisions may
apply in that instance. See generally PETER C. CHRISTIANSON ET AL., LOBBYING, PACs, AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, 50 STATE HANDBOOK (2002) (discussing campaign finance laws in each
state); MICHAELJ. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAs, THE DAYAFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES (1998) (examining state campaign finance
laws).
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
o MCFL was a corporation that engaged in both issue and express advocacy. See id. at
241-44, 249-51 (detailing MCFL's activities and finding express advocacy).
40 Id. at 254-55. The Court recognized that if MCFL engaged in express advocacy, it
could still be subject to the disclosure provisions regarding its contributors and expenditures.
Id. at 262 (finding MCFL will be required to disclose contributions and expenditures meant
to influence elections); see also id. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, the
significant burden on MCFL in this case comes not from the disclosure requirements that it
must satisfy, but from the additional organizational restraints imposed upon it by the Act.").
'02 Id. at 262.
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provisions for political committees-both the information and
corruption justifications-also apply to political organizations that
are almost indistinguishable from political committees.4"' Congress
may not be able to subject political organizations to the same level
of regulation as political committees, but the less onerous disclosure
provisions clearly can be justified by the fact that political organiza-
tions meet the definition of a political committee.40 4
Since political organizations are admittedly organized to
influence elections, they fall squarely within the definition of
political committees and may be regulated under Buckley using
either the broader definition of political committee that applies to
contributions or the more restrictive definition that applies to
expenditures. 4 5 Under either standard, the disclosure provisions in
section 527 should be upheld for similar reasons as those relied on
in Buckley. 46 As the Court noted in Buckley, disclosure provisions
generally are "the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of
campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.
407
2. The Vagueness Concerns in Buckley Do Not Apply to Section
527 Organizations. Even if section 527 organizations are not
" In fact, according to Public Citizen, political organizations are now being used and
controlled by candidates to promote their candidacy. See PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH,
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS' SoFr MONEY ACCOUNTS SHOW NEED FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM BILLS 1 (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications (last visited
Feb. 14, 2002). To the extent that these organizations are not involved in express advocacy,
they contend that they are not subject to FECA. Id. at 5-6. Public Citizen identified sixty-one
members of Congress who have political organizations, and the top twenty-five political
organizations collected approximately $30 million in a two-year election cycle. Id. at 6-8.
' In addition, to the extent that § 527 is considered a tax subsidy, even the greater
regulation that applies to political committees may be permissible. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at
256 n.9 (explaining that, if nonprofit corporations do not set up lobbying arms, they are not
eligible for tax deductible contributions).
4 As previously discussed, many § 527 organizations deliberately avoid "express
advocacy" to escape FECA, claiming that they are not involved in influencing elections, but
describing their activities as election activities when seeking tax exempt status. See supra
notes 46-62 and accompanying text. Treating all § 527 organizations as political committees
would ensure that political organizations could not escape the disclosure provisions while still
obtaining tax-exempt status.
406 The district court in NFRA recognized that political organizations could be required
to disclose expenditures under Buckley, although it found that the disclosure provisions at
issue were unconstitutional because there was not a sufficient relationship between the
disclosure provisions and a substantial Government interest. Nat'l Fed'n of Republican
Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
,o7 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976).
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considered political organizations, the narrowly drawn disclosure
provisions contained in section 527 are constitutional for many of
the same reasons that disclosure provisions are constitutional with
regard to political committees. The Buckley Court limited the
definition of contributions and expenditures because it was con-
cerned that, absent such limitations, individuals and groups
engaged in purely issue discussion would unknowingly find
themselves subject to the disclosure provisions in the Act.408 Thus,
an individual engaged in what she believed was purely issue
discussion might find herself subject to civil and criminal penalties
when she had no intention of engaging in campaign-related speech.
This concern does not exist when political organizations are at issue.
These are organizations formed for the purpose of influencing
elections. By definition, they are not purely engaged in a discussion
of relevant issues. Entities that apply for tax-exempt status under
section 527 assert that they are entitled to that status because they
are engaged in communication for the purpose of influencing
elections.40 9 Any line-drawing problems regarding whether their
communication is designed to influence elections disappear. There
is no trap for the innocent because these entities have announced
their intention to be involved in campaign-related speech.410 The
concerns that motivated the Supreme Court to limit the definitions
of "contribution" and "expenditure" simply do not apply in the
context of political organizations under section 527.4"
40 Id. at 74-77.
o See I.R.C. § 527(e) (2000).
410 For examples of § 527 organizations admitting their intent to influence elections, see
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-25-051 (June 25, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Feb. 20, 1998); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 972-5-036 (June 20, 1997).
41. Opponents of disclosure provisions have argued that disclosure provisions are
unconstitutional because there is a constitutional right to anonymous free speech. McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). McIntyre involved an Ohio statute that
prohibited the distribution of anonymous handbills attempting to influence an election or
ballot initiative. Id. at 336. The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio statute, holding that
an author's decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment. Id. at 341-42. It then concluded that, in this instance, Ohio's interest
in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements and its interest in providing the electorate
with relevant information was an insufficient state interest to overcome the infringement on
the First Amendment. Id. at 348-51. Although it is unclear the extent to which McIntyre
applies outside of the one-on-one communication context presented in the case, it is clear that
McIntyre does not apply to the disclosure provisions in FECA as applied to political
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The approach taken by the reformers in amending section 527 of
the Code was a clever and permissible act of Congress, which was
desperate for campaign finance reform. Since it appeared that
amending FECA and requiring the disclosure of contributions to,
and expenditures of, groups involved in all types of political
advocacy might raise constitutional problems, reformists sought an
alternative path-amending the Internal Revenue Code.
The approach taken by the reformers, or one similar to it, will
likely pass constitutional muster, although the approach is an
inadequate and complicated method of encouraging campaign
finance disclosure. To the extent the provision survives under the
subsidy approach in Regan, an opt-out provision is essential. If the
opt-out provision is real, then at least some organizations will
choose to opt-out of the disclosure scheme. If a sufficient number of
organizations opt-out, or if organizations opt-out only with regard
to controversial contributions or expenditures, the effectiveness of
the disclosure provisions will be seriously impacted.
A more effective and substantially simpler approach would be to
amend FECA and clarify that political organizations are political
committees under FECA.1 2 Alternatively, Congress could create a
committees. Those provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court in Buckley. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 74, 79-80; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 196, 199-
200 (1999) (rejecting name tag requirement for circulators of ballot initiative, but upholding
requirement that circulators sign affidavit when submitting petitions that included their
name and address); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954) (upholding disclosure
provisions requiring disclosure of payments to and expenditures of lobbyists); Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 884 P.2d 116, 126 (Cal. 1994) (holding candidate did not have
First Amendment right to distribute anonymous pamphlets opposing ballot measure); Hasen,
supra note 97, at 273-74 (distinguishing McIntyre from Buckley, reasoning in part that
possibility of corruption is significantly less with regard to ballot initiatives because ballot
measure cannot be corrupted as candidates can); Kornylak, supra note 354, at 254-57
(highlighting three Governmental interests in disclosure provisions of § 527: preventing
corruption, informing electorate, and electoral accountability); Thomas H. Dupree, Jr.,
Comment, Exposing the Stealth Candidate: Disclosure Statutes After McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1211, 1214 (1996) (arguing that televised speech by
political candidates is not protected by McIntyre). But see David W. Ogden & Joel A. Nichols,
The Right to Anonymity Under the First Amendment, 49 FED. LAW. 44,44 (2002) (arguing that
laws that ban anonymous speech are by their very nature disproportionate and content-based
and should be subject to strict scrutiny).
412 If political organizations are political committees under FECA, they would be subject
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new FECA category for political organizations, and provide that
such organizations must disclose their contributors and expendi-
tures. Under this approach, which is an entity approach, the
entity's status under FECA would be determined by its status under
the Internal Revenue Code. If the organization was a political
organization under the Code, it would also be subject to regulation
under FECA. Entities therefore could not seek the benefit of exempt
status while avoiding the disclosure provisions in FECA. Moreover,
the disclosure provisions could be mandatory and no opt-out option
would be required. This approach provides an alternative to the
speech-specific issue/express advocacy distinction currently in
place.4"' Political organizations would become subject to basic
disclosure requirements similar to those now required of entities
engaged in express advocacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The influence of third-party expenditures in political campaigns
has grown immensely since disclosure provisions were first
considered in Buckley v. Valeo. In amending FECA, Congress took
a very broad approach to the regulation of independent expendi-
tures, and in limiting that approach the Supreme Court drastically
curtailed the disclosure provision in FECA. Congress then sought
an alternative way to encourage the disclosure of third-party
expenditures and amended section 527 of the Code using the tax
subsidies provided to political organizations as a mechanism for
encouraging disclosure of campaign expenditures.
to disclosure even if they engaged only in issue advocacy. An alternative approach would be
to restrict § 527 status organizations that are subject to FECA's disclosure provisions. See
generally David S. Karp, Note, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the Regulation of Issue Advocacy
by Tax-Exempt Organizations Through the Internal Revenue Code, 77 N.Y.U..L. REV. 1805
(2002) (arguing that section 527 status should be limited to organizations that engage in
express advocacy).
413 The recently passed McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform measure takes a
different, categorical approach, attempting to define all speech that occurs at a specific time
and references a candidate as electioneering communication subject to disclosure. See
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-91 (2002)
(to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456).
694 [Vol. 37:611
2003] ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND SECTION 527
This approach, or one similar to it, can withstand constitutional
attack. It follows the tax subsidy rationale upheld by the Regan
Court by conditioning a tax benefit on the exempt organization's
compliance with campaign finance disclosure provisions. Although
encouraging disclosure through the tax code is constitutional, it is
not the best approach for mandating campaign finance disclosure.
Since the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions is based on
a tax subsidy argument, some organizations might forgo tax-exempt
status and thereby avoid the disclosure provisions. A better
approach is to use the tax status of the organization as a triggering
mechanism for subjecting the organization to regulation under
FECA. Since political organizations are similar to political commit-
tees, which are already subject to disclosure provisions under FECA,
Congress could mandate under FECA that all political organizations
disclose their contributors and expenditures. Mandating disclosure
through FECA will provide a broader and simpler method for
requiring the disclosure of contributors to, and expenditures of,
third-party organizations involved in political campaigns.
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